Jet Fuel Price Risk Management and Exposure in Small Airlines : Evidence from the Nordic Countries by Hänninen, Joonas
 











JET FUEL PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
EXPOSURE IN SMALL AIRLINES 
 















Ph.D. Terhi Chakhovich   








Table of Contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 7 
1.1 Background ................................................................................................................ 7 
1.2 Aim of the Thesis ....................................................................................................... 9 
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 9 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................ 10 
2 Risk managemenet ................................................................................................ 11 
2.1 Concept of Risk ........................................................................................................ 11 
2.2 Financial Risks ......................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 Hedging ..................................................................................................................... 14 
2.4 Finance Theory and Risk Management ................................................................. 18 
2.5 Price Risk Management and Company Valuation ............................................... 20 
2.6 Commodity Price Risk and Exposure .................................................................... 22 
3 Price of Oil and jet fuel ......................................................................................... 24 
3.1 Oil Price Development During the 2000s............................................................... 24 
3.2 Price Formation of Oil ............................................................................................ 25 
3.3 Unconventional and Alternative Energy Sources ................................................. 28 
4 Managing fuel price risk using derivatives instruments ................................... 31 
4.1 Swaps ........................................................................................................................ 31 
4.2 Futures ...................................................................................................................... 36 
4.3 Forwards .................................................................................................................. 39 
4.4 Options...................................................................................................................... 40 
5 Empirical part ....................................................................................................... 46 
5.1 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 46 
5.2 Nordic Listed Airlines Overview ............................................................................ 50 
5.2.1 Finnair ......................................................................................................... 50 
5.2.2 Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) ........................................................................... 51 
5.2.3 Norwegian Air Shuttle ................................................................................ 51 
5.2.4 Icelandair Group ............................................................................................... 52 
5.2.5 Comparison of the Airlines .............................................................................. 53 
5.3 Jet Fuel Price Exposure .......................................................................................... 55 
5.3.1 Data .................................................................................................................. 55 
5.3.2 Regression analysis ................................................................................... 57 
5.3.3 Results ........................................................................................................ 58 
5.4 Hedging Practices .................................................................................................... 62 
5.4.1 Finnair ......................................................................................................... 62 
5.4.2 Scandinavian Airlines ...................................................................................... 69 
5.4.3 Norwegian Air Shuttle ................................................................................. 73 
5.4.4 Icelandair Group ............................................................................................... 77 
5.4.5 Results on Jet Fuel Hedging Practices ........................................................ 81 
6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 85 
7 Summary ................................................................................................................ 88 
References ...................................................................................................................... 91 
Appendix 1 Qualitative sources ................................................................................... 96 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Price of Brent crude, jet kerosene, and crack spread ................................... 24 
Figure 2 A fixed price swap contract for hedging jet fuel exposure .......................... 33 
Figure 3 Payoff diagram for a $100 long call ................................................... 42 
Figure 4 A collar structure in airlines .............................................................. 43 
Figure 5 Payoff from a zero-cost collar .......................................................... 44 
Figure 6 Total return indexes for the Nordic listed airlines. ...................................... 56 
Figure 7 OMX Icealand Stock Market Index ....................................................... 58 
Figure 8 Jet fuel hedging profile ..................................................................... 63 
Figure 9 Fuel costs of total operating expenses ........ ........................................... 81 
Figure 10 Hedging ratios for the coming year, % of the anticipated jet fuel 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Monthly cash flow settlements of the jet keros ne swap contract ................ 34 
Table 2 Key Information on Nordic listed airlines ..... .............................................. 54 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics .......................................................................... 57 
Table 4 Jet fuel exposures .............................................................................. 60 
Table 5 Hedging of jet fuel price risk at Finnair 2006–2014 ..................................... 67 
Table 6 Hedging of jet fuel price risk at Scandinavian Airlines 2006–2014 ............. 71 
Table 7 Hedging of jet fuel price risk at Norwegian Air Shuttle 2006–2014 ............ 75 







Fuel and labour costs represent the two largest items for airlines’ operating expenses 
(O’Connor & Willliam 2000, 80). In 2001, fuel accounted for 13.4% of the global 
airline industry’s operating costs, while labour costs were 36.2%, whereas in 2008 the 
fuel and labour stood at 34.2% and 21.5% of the total perating expenses respectively. 
The shift of fuel costs to the largest operating expense item for the airline industry is 
largely due to the increase in the price of oil butalso the widening of the refining 
margin1 between jet fuel and crude oil. While in 2003, theav rage price of jet fuel per 
barrel was USD34.7, it had almost quadrupled to USD126.7 in 2008. In addition, 
restructuring of operations and increasing labour productivity have contributed to the 
shift of fuel expenses to the largest operating expense item. (IATA Economic Briefing 
2010.) 
Kerosene (jet fuel) is a refined oil product distilled from crude oil and, thus, its price 
is highly correlated with crude oil price changes (Berghöfer & Lucey 2014). The price 
of crude oil is affected by a variety of local and global factors that translate into fuel 
prices. In addition to the typical demand and supply drivers, oil prices are subject to 
weather conditions that cause disruptions in production, political tensions and decisions, 
comments from influential country leaders, production decisions made by the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and changes in legal as 
well as tax systems. (James 2003, 1–18.) In fact, the international airline industry has 
faced severe fuel price increases over the last fewdecades unlike any other 
transportation industry (Wensveen 2007, 187–188). 
Commodity prices are highly volatile and therefore exhibit a significant source of 
risk for non-financial firms (Bartram 2005). Therefore, volatile fuel prices affect the 
airline industry’s profitability, and airlines have r structured their operations in order to 
cut other expenses. As a result, the airline industry’s sensitivity to fuel price changes 
has increased. For example, the International Airline Transportation Association 
(IATA) downgraded the industry’s profit forecast byUSD500 million mostly due to the 
increase in expected oil prices (Rising Oil Prices – – 2012). However, airlines can try to 
mitigate this commodity price risk and the related exposure by hedging with derivatives 
instruments. In fact, most of the largest U.S. and European airlines do exactly this 
(Morrell & Swan 2006). 
                                                 
1 Refining margin is the spread of jet fuel price over crude oil price. Jet fuel is distilled from crude oil. 
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Volatile commodity prices have an impact on airlines’ profits. According to Morrell 
and Swan (2006) airlines’ profits are volatile because they cannot quickly adapt their 
operating costs to changes in revenue and demand. Another reason is that many airlines 
have acquired their assets with debt capital or via leasing contracts. As a result, small 
changes in operating profits are magnified in large swings in earnings. Consequently, 
commodity price risk management can reduce the impact of the volatile commodity 
prices to a company’s earnings. While hedging against commodity price risk can reduce 
the volatility in a company’s operating profit and earnings, it can also result in severe 
losses. For example, Cathay Pacific, the Hong Kong based carrier, reported a fuel 
hedging loss of HKD7.6 billion (USD979.9 million) for the fiscal year 2008 (Hedging 
Bites Cathay Pacific – – 2009). 
Commercial passenger airlines cannot pass increased fuel prices on to customers 
very easily. However, on the cargo side, airlines have long included fuel price 
surcharges in their fares. For example, the logistics giant FedEx does not hedge any of 
its jet fuel because it can vastly rely on passing the increased fuel prices on to the cargo 
customers. (Morrel & Swan 2006.) On the contrary, it is not that simple to adjust ticket 
prices for passenger airlines. 
Passenger airlines have been exposed to increased competition due to deregulation, 
especially in Europe. Deregulation of the aviation industry has brought in a large 
number of new entrants on to the market and has introduced a number of low-cost 
carriers as well. This has led to lower margins and, i  fact, in Europe there is evidence 
that airlines cannot recover their full cost, which over a longer term is condition for 
sustainable business. (Button, Costa & Cruz 2011.) Likewise, the consumer demand for 
low prices and passengers’ perception of air transportation being an undifferentiated 
commodity often drive prices down to levels where airlines often fail to cover fully 
allocated costs (Wensveen 2007, 189).  
Hedging with financial derivatives, typically requires immediate cash outlays in the 
form of initial margins and the consequent margin calls, especially the exchange-traded 
products (Hull 2009, 26–27). The initial margin repr sents typically as much as 10% of 
the hedged position’s nominal value (James 2003, 35). The positions are settled on a 
daily basis and, therefore, additional margin deposits may be required for both the 
airlines, which are short on fuel, and the risk bearing counterparties. (Hull 2009, 26–
27.) This might pose a problem for smaller carriers that do not have adequate cash 
available for the margins on top of the fuel bill.  
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1.2 Aim of the Thesis 
Recent literature has mostly focused on the impact of commodity price risk on firm 
value. The impact of financial risk management on the value of a firm has been studied 
in several research papers (see Smith & Stulz 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993; 
Allayannis and Weston 2001; Peréz-González and Yun 2014; Jin and Jorion 2004; 
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins 2002; Cobbs and Wolf 2004). However, the commodity 
price exposure is less studied and, in the case of aviation, mostly for large international 
airlines. Of particular interest for the research is the effect of jet fuel price changes on 
the airline stock returns. Studying fuel price risk management and jet fuel exposure in 
the Nordic countries sheds light on how the Nordic airlines manage their fuel price risk. 
This is of particular interest since the Nordic airliners are small airlines in the global 
context and may have less financial resources available for risk management activities. 
In addition, the thesis will provide evidence as to whether the exposure is different from 
that, which has been found among the major U.S. and European airlines. 
The aim of the thesis is to study the effect of jet fuel price risk exposure on the 
Nordic countries’ listed airlines over the time period of 2006 to 2014. The listed airlines 
in the Nordic countries include Finnair, Scandinavian Airlines, Incelandair Group, and 
Norwegian Air Shuttle. The exposure is measured as the sensitivity of stock price 
returns to the underlying source of exposure as in Jorion (1996). The exposure studied 
in the thesis is the price return of jet fuel. This approach has a clear benefit: instead of 
having to estimate the exposure with an indirect measure, such as Tobin’s Q, the 
approach allows the exposure coefficients to be estimated on stock returns. 
In addition, the thesis investigates how airlines in the Nordic countries manage fuel 
price risk, and whether they prefer some products to others given that they are rather 
small in size. This is done in a multi-year context which enables to draw conclusions on 
how systematic the hedging is over time. It may be that the publicly traded derivatives 
instruments with their margin requirements are not feasible for smaller Nordic carries, 
due to the required liquidity for initial margins and additional margin calls. What is 
more, the data allows analysing whether the exposure is different for low-cost carrier 
when compared to traditional full service airlines and whether the hedging practices are 
different since one (Norwegian Air Shuttle) of the four listed airlines in the Nordic 
countries is a low-cost carrier. 
1.3 Methodology 
The thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative methods. Using the publicly listed 
stock return data of the airlines from the Nordic countries, the extent of jet fuel price 
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exposure is estimated. Eight years of stock return data on the four carries was gathered 
from Datastream database. 
The qualitative approach analyses the fuel price risk management practices among 
the carriers. The qualitative part is conducted by researching the annual reports, 
financial reports, and interim reports of the publicly traded airlines in the Nordic 
countries. The analysis covers the same period as in the quantitative analysis. 
Consequently, the thesis yields information how the hedging practices have evolved, 
and how systematic the airlines are with their hedging practices over a longer time 
period. To supplement the data gathered from the published materials, an interview of 
an industry practitioner responsible for risk management operations is included in the 
thesis so as to further elaborate the practicalities of jet fuel hedging. The interview was 
semi-structured in nature, which allows the interviwee to discuss the fuel price risk 
management instruments and practices relatively broadly. What is more, studying the 
financial statements of the airlines for several years enhances the data because detailed 
information about risk management policies, commodity price risk hedging, and 
company’s views on fuel price risk can be found from the statements. 
By combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods, the study aims at 
further understanding the fuel price risk exposure and potentially finding supporting 
evidence or reasoning behind the quantitative results. To the best of the writer’s 
knowledge, the thesis is the first to employ mixed-methods approach in studying jet fuel 
price exposure and hedging. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
In the second chapter, the relevant literature and research behind managing commodity 
price risk is discussed. The third chapter analyses th  price development of crude oil 
and jet kerosene. In addition, the price formation of crude oil is discussed and the 
potential for unconventional energy sources is also discussed. The fourth chapter 
introduces how airlines can manage fuel price risk u ing derivatives instruments. In the 
fifth chapter, the focus is on jet fuel exposure of the Nordic airlines and how they 
manage fuel price risk. The sixth chapter provides th  conclusions and the final chapter 
includes a summary of the thesis. 
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2 RISK MANAGEMENET 
2.1 Concept of Risk 
Risk is inherent in all human activities and it stems from the fact that many future 
events are unknown in nature. Therefore, risk can be defined as “the exposure to 
uncertainty”. Consequently, when studying risk, two concepts must be segregated and 
analysed separately. The first one being the uncertainty itself, and the second one being 
the exposure of an individual, company, or entity to that very uncertainty. (Lhabitant & 
Tinguely 2001, 345.) 
Uncertainty could be described as the possible occurrence of one or multiple events 
that can be estimated with probability distributions, so any possible realization of all the 
possible events can occur with a given probability. As a result, future events must be 
precisely described and their probability distributons determined in order to study the 
uncertainty. Therefore, analysing uncertainty is often difficult since the probability 
distributions of events are not known and they must therefore be inferred. In addition, 
possible realizations on any event are difficult to determine. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 
2001, 345.) The abovementioned concept of uncertainty was introduced by Knight 
(1921) in his famous dissertation Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Knight proposed that 
uncertainty cannot be measured and that is why it is different from the concept risk. 
Hence, the immeasurable uncertainty is often cited as the Knightian uncertainty. 
Uncertainty may also be ambiguity when it cannot be quantified, but the probabilities of 
different events can be ranked according to their relative likelihood (Krause 2006, 707). 
While uncertainty is one important factor in assessing risk, the exposure to the 
uncertainty is another critical component of the concept of risk. Different activities, 
individuals, companies, and entities are not similarly ffected by the same uncertainty. 
For example, future weather, which clearly cannot be known at present, affects groups 
heterogeneously. Weather conditions may be crucial for agriculture, while they have 
very little impact on a number other economic activities. Therefore, the exposure to 
uncertainty plays a significant role in whether one is faced with a given risk or whether 
it is of no significance at all. Consequently, identifying the exposures to given 
uncertainties is essential in initiating risk management. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001, 
345.) 
Risk management is not about avoiding risk entirely nor is it about seeking it. In fact, 
risk itself is neither good nor bad. Rather, companies should take risks in order to stay 
in business and gain competitive advantage. What is important, however, is that 
companies identify and manage risks properly. Identifyi g risks and managing them 
properly may even become a source of profit for companies. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 
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2001, 345.) What is more, firms must decide how much risk to assume. On one hand 
assuming a lot of risk (that is, not transferring any risk at all) has the potential to carry 
large positive cash flows. On the other hand, it bears the potential to large losses as 
well. Assuming little risk leads to lower potential cash flows but at the same time 
lessens the potential negative impact on cash flows. Put differently, the more risk a 
company assumes the higher the standard deviation of the expected cash flows. 
(Keown, Titman, and Martin 2011, 651–652.) On the contrary, mismanaged, wrongly 
priced, misunderstood, and unidentified risk can adversely affect an organization’s 
profits. Therefore, risk management is about optimizing risk, and thus successful 
companies ought to take necessary risks to achieve goals but avoid excessive risk 
taking. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001, 345.) 
  
2.2 Financial Risks 
Companies are faced with several kinds of risks when engaging in business activities. 
They include market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and basis risk. They can be analysed 
with regards to business in general and with respect to derivatives contracts. 
Market risk as a broad concept includes any potential loss due to adverse change in 
market variables. These variables include interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity 
prices, and commodity prices. They may have a direct or indirect impact on companies. 
The erosion of company’s operating margins due to increase in input prices is an 
example of a direct impact. On the contrary, if suppliers are exposed to changes in some 
market variables and, as a consequence, face difficulties, a company faces an indirect 
impact. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001, 346.) In the energy market, market risk is often 
referred to as price risk, and producers will typically face a loss when prices fall. In 
contrast, energy users are adversely affected when the prices rise. (James 2003, 2.) This 
commodity price risk is especially evident for airlines. If the price of oil soars, the cost 
for airlines also increases. Commodity price risk can also be very subtle in some 
unusual instances. A case in point is aluminium production in Iceland. The production 
of aluminium requires a lot of electricity as a primary input. However, the aluminium 
producers in Iceland enjoy electricity produced from the country’s abundant geothermal 
energy sources. Thus, when the price of oil increases the costs for their competitors rise, 
while the input costs of Icelandic manufacturers remain unchanged resulting in 
competitive advantage. On the contrary, when the price of oil decreases and the cost for 
competitors decrease, the Icelandic aluminium producers lose the competitive 
advantage. (Smith, Smithson & Wilford 2003, 346.) Regardless of the industry or 
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source of price risk, market risk by definition can be transferred in the market. 
(Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001, 346.) 
Credit risk stems from the fact that counterparty may be unable to perform an 
obligation (Olson & Wu 2008, 18). There is a possibility that borrowers, bond issuers, 
or counterparties in derivatives transactions will default (Hull 2010, 289). In fact, most 
transactions involve some credit risk. They range from failing to pay an amount when 
due, defaulting on conventional loans, to trade credits and receivables being written off. 
(Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001, 346.) In the case of derivatives contracts, it is said that a 
hedge2 is only as reliable as the credit worthiness of the counterparty. Especially in the 
energy industry, credit risk management has become a top priority due to the Enron 
disaster and the credit crunch. (James 2003, 2.) 
Liquidity risk is related to the ease of converting an asset into cash amount equal to 
its current market value. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001, 347). In addition, a liquid 
position means that it can be converted into cash on sh rt notice (Hull 2010, 385). The 
liquidity risk arises typically from insufficient market depth or if the market faces 
disruptions. What is more, the liquidity risk is particularly high in over-the-counter 
markets. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001, 347). Liquidity risks can be triggered by financial 
crises. If one has to liquidate an asset into cash, it t en could lead to fire-sale of the 
asset. If the market for a given asset becomes illiquid, it translates into larger bid-offer 
spreads3. Therefore, liquidating the asset could lead to losses. Liquidity risk can also be 
related to the size of position. For example, in publicly listed large companies the 
liquidity risk is typically of no concern. Whether the position is 10 000 stocks or 100 
stocks, it can easily be easily liquidated on short no ice. However, a $100 million 
investment in non-investment grade company bond might be difficult to liquidate close 
to the market price in short time period. What is more, the bid and offer prices are also 
affected by the quantity in the transaction. Typically, the larger the quantity in a selling 
transaction, the higher the offer price. Similarly, the larger the quantity when buying, 
the lower the bid price. (Hull 2010, 385–387.) In eergy derivatives contracts, the 
market can become illiquid due to political and military conflicts. For example, during 
the Gulf War there was such high market volatility that several banks and oil traders 
would not present bid or offer prices. As a result, companies exposed to the market 
could not always close out their positions or could only do so at a great discount. (James 
2003, 3.) 
                                                 
2 A contract or action aimed at reducing the risk profile of company’s future cashflows. 
3 Bid-offer spread is the price difference between the bid price at which an asset can be sold and the offer 
price at which the asset can be bought on the market. Th  better the liquidity the narrower the spread. 
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Companies that use derivatives instruments in price sk management are also 
exposed to a risk particular to the derivatives contracts – that is, basis risk. The basis is 
the difference between the spot price of the asset being hedged and the price of the 
derivatives contract being used. (Hull 2009, 51–52.) Therefore, if the price difference 
between the two prices (often different products) collapses or moves adversely, it could 
lead to a loss. In price risk management, it means that the price of the hedge (derivatives 
contract) may not move in sync with the underlying asset that is being hedged. 
Typically, the movements in the energy sector can be triggered by several factors such 
as poor weather conditions, political and military developments, or changes in 
regulation. (James 2003, 4–5.) 
The basis risk is composed of locational basis and time basis. Locational basis 
emerges if a company uses a derivatives contract tht is priced against exactly the same 
commodity but trades in a different geographical region. Consequently, the price in the 
two regions (the location of the physical commodity being used and the location where 
the derivatives contract is priced) may diverge due to local supply/demand factors, 
political tensions, or pipeline problems. For example, if a company consumes European 
gasoil and the derivatives contract used in hedging is Singapore gasoil, the locational 
basis risk emerges. (James 2003, 5.)  
The time basis results when the physical consumption of the commodity takes place 
at another time than the hedge expires. The hedger may be uncertain as to when the 
exact physical transaction of the asset is taking place. It is also possible that hedger 
must close out the hedged position before the expiry of the contracts. (Hull 2009, 51.) 
For example, an electricity producer that expects higher natural gas prices (an input in 
energy production) in the summer time hedges its position by buying August contracts 
in natural gas. However, if heat waves arrive early in the summer, say in June, the price 
for natural gas would spike then, and could already be substantially lower in August. As 
a result, the contract would not provide sufficient protection due to time disparity. 
(James 2003, 5.) When there is more than one mismatch between the underlying in the 
hedging instrument and the physical consumption of commodity, a mixed basis risk 
arises. For example, if an airline uses a March Jet Kerosene swap to hedge January 
Gasoil Cargo consumption, both a time and product basis exposures emerge. (James 
2003, 5.) 
2.3 Hedging 
At a general level risk management is the decisions and actions taken by a company to 
alter the risk profile of its future cash flows. An attempt to reduce risk through these 
actions is considered hedging, while increasing the exposures a company faces is 
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considered speculation. Therefore, it is important to distinct between these two when 
considering risk management. However, one should note that hedging does not alter the 
risk itself but only transfers it to a counterparty willing to bear it. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 
2003, 347.)  
Companies can have different approaches towards risk. They can ignore the risk, 
which typically means not taking any measures in maaging risks. However, this is not 
really a relevant option because the public, regulators, investors, and customers demand 
greater accountability from the companies, and the management is often held personally 
accountable for large losses. Then, companies can try to limit risks. In doing so, higher 
level of management can place limits on how much risk the lower levels of management 
are allowed to assume. The effectiveness of such measur s, however, is dependent on 
how well both the higher and lower management can measure and monitor the 
exposures. In addition, companies can diversify risks, that is, take several uncorrelated 
risks. This is typically integrated, at least to some degree, in the operation of large firms 
that have several product and/or service lines. However, this is not the case with smaller 
firms that are far more specialised in their busines operations. Lastly, companies can 
manage risks.  However, managing risks does not necessarily mean that all the risks are 
transferred. Instead, a company may choose which risks the company sees as a part of 
its core operations, and which risks the company wishes to transfer to other parties 
using derivatives instruments. As there is not one ptimal solution to risk management, 
managing risks is often company specific. Individual companies need therefore to 
consider alternatives that best suit their business objectives, general views of world, and 
obviously their budgets. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 2003, 347–349.) 
At the core of risk management is the assessment of which risks a company should 
retain and which risks to mitigate by transferring the risk to outside parties. For 
example, historically oil and gas exploration and production companies did not hedge 
against the price fluctuation of oil and gas because they viewed that investors wanted to 
remain exposed to these risks. Management viewed that it was the main reason why 
they had invested in these sectors in the first place. More recently, however, these very 
companies have started to hedge against the commodity price risk because they view 
that their business is oil and gas exploration and production, not speculation in energy 
prices. Companies now view that they can operate more efficiently as they are not fully 
exposed to future commodity price fluctuations. (Keown et al. 2011, 651.) 
 Airlines, can try to mitigate fuel price risk using different approaches that are not 
mutually exclusive and can be used simultaneously. Airlines may improve fuel 
efficiency of their operations, try to pass fuel price increases on to customers either 
using fuel surcharges or fare increases, or hedge fuel price exposures using derivatives 
markets or physical commodity markets. (Morrell 2003, 188–190.)  
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Typically, airlines buy fuel at major airports around the world, and large 
multinational fuel companies or their subsidiaries supply it. The supplier companies are 
responsible for the storage and delivery of the jet fuel at the airport. Purchasing 
contracts with large oil companies typically include a clause that allow for adjusting the 
prices in accordance with world market price movements. Therefore, the fuel prices for 
airlines typically increase with little time lag with regards to crude oil price increases. 
Occasionally, airlines have co-operated and jointly purchased and stored fuel at some 
airports, in order to assure fuel supply at a reason ble price with better bargaining 
power. (Morrel 2003, 188–190.) However, these consortiums are not large in scale. In 
fact, they are not necessarily even airline alliance4-wide consortiums. (Holloway 2008, 
288.) Moreover, airlines can try to pass price increases on to customers or introduce fuel 
surcharges, but these measures are more feasible on the cargo side of the industry. 
(Morrel 2003, 188–190.) Unlike any other airline befor , the American-based Delta Air 
Lines took a novel and unconventional approach in ma aging fuel price risk and bought 
its own oil refinery to refine jet fuel from crude oil. According to the company, they 
especially aim at managing the crack spread (the spr ad between jet fuel and crude oil 
prices), or the refining margin, of jet fuel over crude oil. What is more, the airline 
highlighted that it seeks to benefit from sourcing potentially cheaper crude oil sources 
from the states of North and South Dakota. (CAPA 2012.)  
In the short-term, increasing fuel efficiency relies on operating procedures such as 
flying at an optimal cruise speed, or using tankering policies. Tankering means that 
airlines tank up more fuel at a destination than would be the minimum required fuel 
level, taking into consideration the reserve fuel levels, if the cost of fuel is significantly 
lower there. Normally, for the short or medium haul flights, airlines need not to refill at 
the destination airport unless they tanker. Although, the extra fuel must be carried and it 
increases the fuel consumption as the weight of the plane increases, it might reduce the 
overall fuel bill. (Morrell 2003, 188–190.) Another potential operating procedure 
reducing fuel consumption and, therefore, fuel costs, is flying direct routing. Direct 
routing means flying straight from point A to B, where possible. For example, flying 
straight from Bangkok to Tokyo, instead of several w ypoints, would reduce the route 
length by 20 nautical miles. This would result in 190 kilograms less fuel consumed on 
an average Airbus A330 wide-body aircraft (an aircrft with two passenger ailes) 
operating the route. On the same route, flying as little as 2000 feet below the optimum 
flight path altitude results in 600 kilograms more fu l consumed. Also, making sure that 
the cruising speed is optimal reduces fuel consumption. If the cruising speed on the 
                                                 
4 Airline alliance is a group of airlines closely coopearating. They offer the whole route network of the
alliance to customers wihtout having to fly to every destination themselves airline by airline. They also 
share the customer loyalty programs to benefit the ravelers using the airlines in the alliance. 
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Airbus A330 is 0.01 Mach above the optimum, it will burn 800 kilograms more fuel on 
this 2500 nautical mile route. Lastly, making sure that only needed catering is carried on 
the plane, results in less fuel consumption as well. For example, on the Bangkok-Tokyo 
route, every 100 liters of unused drinking water causes a 15-kilogram increase in fuel 
consumption. (Weselby 2012.) The operating procedures, however, cannot be 
dramatically altered due to strict safety requirements, but small changes can add up to 
significant savings in total. (Morrel 2003, 188–190.) 
Over the longer term, airlines can also replace the fle t using more fuel efficient 
aircrafts, but it can only take place gradually. However, once replaced, the more fuel 
efficient fleet has the same impact as financial hedging, as it reduces profit volatility 
resulting from fuel price swings. (Morrell 2003, 188–190.) Modern aircrafts are very 
fuel efficient when comparing to jet airliners of the past decades due to advances in 
technology. Since the introduction of the commercial jet airliner, the fuel consumption 
per seat has decreased by as much as 70% to date. The introduction of composite 
materials in aircrafts results in significantly lower fuel consumption. For example, the 
Airbus A350 has more than 50% of composite materials n it. When compared to 
similar wide-body aircraft Boeing 777, an aircraft wi h much less composite materials, 
the A350 burns 25% less fuel. (Weselby 2012.) Similarly, the American plane 
manufacturer Boeing has introduced its wide-body aircr ft, b787 Dreamliner, with 
significant fuel efficiency gains. When compared to the Boeing 777, it burns about 20% 
less fuel. Also, composite materials play an essential role in the manufacturing process. 
The Dreamliner is 50% made out of composite materials, whereas the 777 has only 12% 
composite materials in it. (Boeing Program Fact Sheet 2014.) 
Lastly, companies can manage financial risk by employing derivatives contracts. 
Commodity producers and users can transfer the commodity price risk to speculators 
that are willing to bear the risk. The commodity users typically take long positions5 in 
the futures market, as they are short6 the underlying commodity. For example, airlines 
typically engage in taking long positions in order to hedge against rising fuel prices. As 
airlines hedge against price fluctuations of future cash position in a commodity, they are 
considered hedgers. The counterparties, that have no physical requirements for the 
commodity, are the speculators. They, however, facilit te the risk transformation and 
are in fact the largest participants in the market. Without the speculators that seek to 
profit from falling and rising prices, there would not be sufficient liquidity in the 
market. (Fabozzi, Fuss & Kaiser 2008, 5–6.) There are several derivatives instruments 
                                                 
5 By having a long hedge in derivatives, a company mitigates the impact of a price increase of an input. 
Therefore, it can be considered as an input hedge. 
6 In physical markets, a short position means that a company uses the physical commodity as an input and 
is adversely affected should the price of the input increase. Note that in derivatives a short hedge is 
typically used to mitigate price decrease of an output. 
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that airlines, and other companies for that matter, can use in hedging activities. They 
include forward contracts, futures contracts, options, and swaps. What is more, airlines 
can use combinations of derivatives instruments andconstruct different hedging 
structures. These will be covered in more detail in the following chapters. Hedging 
requires capital, for example, in the form of initial margins and margin calls. Therefore, 
most young passenger airlines do not engage in finac al hedging at first because they 
use their credit to finance their potentially high rowth rates. (Morrell 2007, 190–191.)  
2.4 Finance Theory and Risk Management 
According to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), investors are only interested in 
beta, which represents the market risk, and not the idiosyncratic risk, which is a 
company-specific risk. This is because, unlike the idiosyncratic risk, the market risk 
cannot be diversified away. (Welch 2014, 221.) CAPM implies that investors diversify 
away the company specific risk by investing in a diversified portfolio and are only 
willing to pay for reduction in the non-diversifiable market risk (Morrell & Swan 2006, 
715). If a company hedges against a company-specific exposure, investors with 
diversified portfolios will not appreciate this if the hedging incurs additional expenses 
for the company. The rationale behind this is that t e company specific risk has very 
little significance in the overall portfolio risk and its value. (Fite & Pfleiderer 1995, 
142.) What is more, some managers choose not to hedge because they believe financial 
manipulation is not within the firm’s expertise and investor should do it instead. The 
argument goes that companies are in the business of producing goods and services, not 
to speculate in the financial markets. Similarly, many managers believe that the cost of 
hedging systematically exceeds the potential benefits. (Lhabitant & Tinguely 2001.)  
However, in the case of state-owned airlines hedging can be justified. A state is not 
typically a portfolio investor. Therefore, the portf lio of the state is not highly 
diversified among different companies and different sectors. The better the 
diversification of the portfolio, the less risk remains in the overall portfolio. 
Consequently, the risk is not diversified away in the overall state portfolio. As a result, 
hedging against fuel price risk may be justified in the special case of state ownership. 
(Morrel 2007, 192–193.) 
It is not obvious however, that eliminating market risk will have an impact on a 
company’s value or that the company will gain from it. Unexpected oil price shocks are 
an example of a pervasive risk that has an impact on several companies. However, oil 
price shocks affect different companies in different ways. Typically oil price increases 
benefit oil producing companies and their earnings i crease as a result. On the contrary, 
airlines’ earnings will decrease as a result. Therefore, an investor with a diversified 
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portfolio is at least partly hedged against this market risk if he/she holds both the oil 
companies’ and airlines’ shares. If airlines have a long position in oil futures contracts 
obtained from oil companies (as they typically do), and oil companies a corresponding 
short position (hedge against falling prices), the exposure of an investor holding both 
the airlines’ and oil companies’ stocks remains uncha ged. (Fite & Pfleiderer 1995, 
142–143.) 
In their famous study, Modigliani and Miller (1958) conclude that a company’s 
financing decisions concerning debt and equity are irrelevant under perfect market 
conditions. This can be extended to the company’s risk hedging policy as well. Similar 
to the company’s financing decisions, investors can hedge on their own using the same 
derivatives instruments or undo the company’s hedging decisions by taking the exact 
opposite position. However, Lhabitant and Thinguely (2001) point out that due to 
market imperfections, such as transaction costs, companies should execute the hedging 
instead of the individual investors. For example, the scale of the derivatives trading 
conducted by companies provides them with lower transaction costs when compared to 
individual investors. What is more, hedging against fuel price risk is beneficial for 
airlines when near bankruptcy, even under the effici nt market conditions (Morrell & 
Swan 2006). According to Pulvino (1998), airlines with financial constraints and low 
spare debt capacity are often forced to liquidate their assets when the overall industry 
faces difficulties. The study found that financially weak airlines received an average 
discount of 14% in distressed asset sales when compared to the average market prices of 
aircrafts. Morrell and Swan (2006) suggest that this could incur additional losses to 
financially distressed airlines.  
Financial distress and bankruptcy cause other direct costs as the need for legal, 
auditing, and other expert services increase. However, the associated indirect financial 
distress costs are claimed to be even more substantial. These include diverting the top 
management’s attention from managing the daily business of the company, the 
unwillingness of suppliers to engage in longer-term contracts, and the customers being 
more reluctant to buy the company’s products or servic s. (Fite & Pfleiderer 1995, 154.) 
For airlines, financial distress incurs additional costs because they might have to engage 
in fire sale of their assets in order to remain as a going-concern. In this kind of 
operational environment, it is justifiable to hedge against fuel price risk since it may 
result in avoiding bankruptcy in case of sudden increase in the price of jet fuel. (Morrell 
& Swan 2006.) Reducing the earnings volatility by hedging can lower the probability of 
the financial distress and the related costs (Lhabitant & Thinguely 2001). However, it is 
in these very instances that the distressed airlines do not have the resources needed to 
acquire derivatives contracts for hedging because of the required cash margins. The 
cash margins ensure that the airline can honour the contract even if it becomes 
unprofitable for the airline. (Morrell & Swan 2006.) 
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According to Morrell and Swan (2006), the expected value of a commodity price 
hedge is zero. If airlines are making profits with fuel hedging and are expect to do so in 
the future, they should have a separate proprietary desk for hedging because they no 
longer are hedging but rather speculating. In reality, positions between sellers and 
buyers of the derivatives instruments in oil are evnly balanced between the two groups. 
Therefore, it is a zero-sum game and while one party gains from a contract, the other 
party faces the exact opposite loss. In addition, the markets are deep and liquid meaning 
that there is a lot of participants including professional traders, commodity suppliers, 
and significant portfolio investors. Airlines’ hedges, on the contrary, are rather 
insignificant in proportion to the overall market volume. Consequently, airlines’ 
transactions have no impact on the market prices, which represent a well-examined 
consensus. However, the idea that airlines profit only by chance and should expect zero 
profits over the long term, does not imply that hedging is not justified. Airlines hedge in 
order to reduce volatility in expenditures and profits; to keep profits closer to an 
average. 
There is indeed evidence that managing fuel price rsk can reduce the income 
volatility of an airline. Rao (1999) studied the impact of fuel price hedging on an 
airline’s quarterly income using an average airline that was based on the ten largest US 
carriers’ quarterly income, cost and revenue data. Heating oil futures contracts where 
used as the hedging instrument for quarterly fuel consumption. The results exhibited a 
more than 23% reduction in quarterly pre-tax income volatility. The results are in line 
with Morrell & Swan’s (2006) reasoning of reducing the income volatility instead of 
aiming at long-term profits. Rao (1999), much like Morrel & Swan (2006), also notes 
that while there is a potential to offset fuel price increase and the results in current 
period earnings, the objective of hedging is very much to reduce the earnings volatility 
over time instead of the current period. 
2.5 Price Risk Management and Company Valuation 
A wide body of literature concerning risk management has been focused on the relation 
between hedging various risks and their effect on firm value. Here we introduce the 
relevant literature and its results. 
In their study, Smith and Stulz (1985) developed a positive theory of hedging and 
firm value maximisation. They found that hedging increases firm valuation if a 
company faces aconvex tax function, that is, the marginal tax rate does not i crease 
linearly with regards to pre-tax firm value but rather is zero up until a certain pre-tax 
income level and from there on increases as a convex function. For example, if a 
company’s pre-tax value increased by a given procentag , the corporate tax bill would 
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not increase linearly but less up until a point where the increase would be similar. 
Similarly, the post-tax firm value is a concave function of the pre-tax income, meaning 
that increasing the pre-tax value would increase the post-tax valuation more, but the 
post-tax value increase would diminish at a certain pre-tax valuation and the increased 
tax liability would undo the increased pre-tax value. Therefore, as long as the cost of 
hedging does not exceed the increase in post-tax firm value, the post-tax valuation 
increases more than the corporate tax liability. In addition, firms can benefit from 
hedging since it can reduce the expected bankruptcy costs, even though the hedging 
might be costly. Similarly, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) studied rationales 
behind corporate financial hedging and concluded that hedging can significantly reduce 
the costs of external funding and, thus, alleviate underinvestment problem and therefore 
increase firm value. 
The hedging of specific risks and their impact on firm valuation has also been 
studied in various papers. Allayannis and Weston (2001) examined the effect of foreign 
exchange hedging and the relative firm valuation usi g the Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is 
derived by dividing the market value of the company’s assets by the replacement cost of 
the assets in place. Firm’s that earn negative excess r turns and aren’t utilizing their 
assets efficiently have a value of less than 1.0. On the contrary, companies that employ 
their assets efficiently are typically trading at Tobin’s Q of over 1.0. (Damodaran 2012, 
538.) The results by Allayanis and Weston (2001) showed that foreign exchange 
hedging increased firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. They interpret the results 
as hedging the foreign currency risk is positively related to firm value and it increases 
the relative valuation of the company. Likewise, Peréz-González and Yun (2014) 
studied the effects of hedging with weather derivatives contracts for gas and electric 
utilities companies. They found that companies that started employing weather 
derivatives contracts saw at least a 6% increase in market-to-book ratios. In addition, 
they discovered that hedging led to more aggressive financing policies and higher 
investment levels. This is in line with the Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and their 
alleviation of underinvestment problem. However, Jin and Jorion (2004) studied the 
hedging activities of U.S. oil and gas producers against gas and oil price risk.  They 
came up with contradicting results and concluded that ere is no clear evidence that 
hedging gas and oil price risk affects firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. They 
question if the positive firm value found in other studies is solely due to financial 
hedging or could it be the total impact of hedging activities, including operational 
hedging as well. 
There is evidence that fuel hedging makes economic sense to airlines. Carter, Rogers, 
and Simkins (2002) studied the effect of jet fuel hdging on firm value among 26 U.S. 
airlines. As measured by Tobin’s Q, they found a hedging premium of 14.94–16.08% 
for the airlines that engage in jet fuel hedging. In addition, they reported that initiating a 
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jet fuel hedging program increased firm valuation by 12.55–13.68% when compared to 
non-hedgers. They argued that the hedging premium was due to the fact that during high 
jet fuel prices the airline industry has low cash flows and investment possibilities are 
positively related to high jet fuel prices. Therefor , hedging fuel price risk protects cash 
flows during high jet fuel price periods, and enables the airlines to buy assets from 
distressed airlines at a discount. Again, the interpretation is in line with Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) where they concluded that hedging might alleviate the 
underinvestment problem. However, in a revised study on jet fuel hedging and firm 
valuation, Carter, Roger and Simkins (2006) found a hedging premium that was less 
than in the original paper. The hedging premium in the revised study was between 5–
10%. 
Cobbs and Wolf (2004) studied the relationship betwe n the level of hedging and 
firm valuation among U.S. airlines. They concluded that the more of the upcoming fuel 
consumption was hedged the higher the company’s valuation. In addition, they found 
that the companies employing a systematic fuel price risk management program paid the 
average market price or less for jet fuel, whereas the companies not systematically 




2.6 Commodity Price Risk and Exposure 
Most of the previous literature has focused on hedging and firm valuation. However, 
commodity price risks and related exposures are less studied. Even tough, they have the 
benefit of allowing the researchers to analyse the dir ct impact of a given exposure to 
company’s stock returns instead of having to deal with indirect measures such as the 
Tobin’s Q. 
In a large study on commodity price exposures on no-financial firms, Bartram 
(2005) studied the effect of various commodity price exposures to different non-
financial industries. In the study including 490 nonfinancial firms, he found that the 
commodity price exposures were significant for the sample firms. However, the fraction 
of companies with statistically significant firm exposure was similar to interest rate 
exposures found in other studies. Despite the fact that the commodity prices exhibit 
higher volatility than interest rates, Bartram suggests that, on one hand, the commodity 
price exposures might have little impact on the overall cash flows for some companies. 
On the other hand, the companies are somewhat successful in hedging the commodity 
price risks. 
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Among the airline industry there is only few papers studying the direct exposure to 
jet fuel price risks. Carter, Rogers, Simkins, and Treanor (2014) studied the extent of jet 
fuel price risk exposure to publicly traded U.S. airlines. They found that the exposure 
coefficients are larger when jet fuel prices are high or on the rise. With similar 
approach, Berghöfer and Lucey (2014) studied the jet fuel price exposure between the 
U.S, European, and Asian carriers. They found the Asian carriers to be more exposed 
than European airlines but less than their American ounterparts. In addition, the 
differences between the regional exposures were statistic lly significant. Similarly, 
Carter, Rogers, Simkins, and Treanor (2014) found that he jet fuel exposure was of 
statistical significance for all the continents’ airlines. 
In addition to United States, Asia, and Europe, Loudon (2004) studied the financial 
risk exposures in New Zealand and Australia. In the paper, Loudon investigated and 
compared the Australian flagship carrier, Qantas, and the New Zealand’s national 
carrier Air New Zealand. The results were ambiguous. With regards to fuel price risk 
the results varied between the companies and different time-horizons. For Qantas, the 
fuel price exposures were all negative, and more significant over the longest periods of 
52 and 156-week time-horizons. However, there were differences among the two 
carriers. Surprisingly, the Air New Zealand had a positive jet fuel price risk coefficient 
for the time horizons of 4, 13, and 52 weeks, with the 52-week time-horizon being 
statistically significant. The sample period was from 1996 to 2003. 
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3 PRICE OF OIL AND JET FUEL 
3.1 Oil Price Development During the 2000s 
The price of crude oil has been quite volatile in the 21st century. In addition, the overall 
price level has increased quite significantly. Figure 1 displays the monthly spot prices 
per barrel of the Brent crude oil, jet kerosene (Cargoes CIF7 Northwest Europe), and the 
difference between the two known as the crack spread or, alternatively, refining margin. 
The data is collected from Thomson-Reuters Datastrem database. 
 
Figure 1 Price of Brent crude, jet kerosene, and crack spread 
It can be seen from the Figure 1 that the price of crude oil has been mostly on the 
increase since the beginning of the 2000s. In January 2000, Brent crude traded at 
USD24.09 per barrel and from there on it mostly kept rising, until peaking at 
USD145.65 in July 2008. However, the Global Financil Crisis caused the price of 
crude oil to fall sharply down to USD43.84 in only five months. The price rebounded 
quite quickly to about USD120 per barrel and has been trading at more than USD100 
for the last few years. 
                                                 
















Jet fuel is refined from crude oil and thus exhibits high correlation with the price of 
crude oil, as can be observed from the Figure 1. However, the crack spread, which 
represents the refining margin over the price of crude oil, does not seem to remain 
constant over the time period. In January 2001, the crack spread stood at USD10 per 
barrel but has varied over time. Two observations concerning the crack spread can be 
made from the Figure 1. First, the refining margin was lower when the crude traded at 
lower prices during the first five years. In addition, the refining margin has been higher 
during last few years when oil has been trading at USD100 or more. Secondly, the 
refining margin tends to widen during higher volatility of crude oil prices. Morrell 
(2008) argues that the refining margin tends to widen uring eras of military conflict 
when the need for jet fuel by the military sharply increases. This has been the case in the 
beginning of the 1970s, 1980s, and the 2000s. 
3.2 Price Formation of Oil 
Jet fuel is refined from crude oil and, therefore, the development of crude oil price 
influences the jet fuel prices significantly. In orde  to better understand the volatile 
nature of jet kerosene prices, it is important to study the price formation of crude oil. 
The crude oil market is the largest commodity market in the world with production 
valued at USD2.7 trillion in 2012. Since crude oil has high yield in energy production in 
relation to low production costs, it is the most significant source of fuel for 
transportation and other industrial applications. (Valiante 2013, 74.) All crude oil 
varieties are priced against benchmark crudes, the most important of which are the West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI), ICE Brent, and DME Oman – the newest of the benchmarks. 
ICE and DME are also major oil exchanges. The functio  of these benchmark crudes is 
to facilitate the price discovery between the globa marginal demand and supply. 
Although the crude oil price should stand at a level where the marginal cost of 
production is equal to marginal utility from the consumption, the crude oil price tends to 
trade at a level above the lowest marginal cost of pr duction. For example, the marginal 
cost of producing WTI from the Gulf States’ fields could be as low as USD6.00 per 
barrel. Instead, the price of crude oil tends to reflect approximately its value in use, and 
not its marginal cost of production. This is due to the fact that consumers compete over 
crude oil supply at unprecedented levels, which pushes the oil demand schedule 
outwards. The demand from developing countries, especially China, has significantly 
contributed to this phenomenon. (Garis 2009, 421–422.) 
Futures markets play a significant role in deriving the crude oil spot market prices. 
The futures market represents the expected future pric of oil that serves as a proxy for 
pricing the commodity in the present. In the futures markets, hedgers try mitigate their 
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price risk while their counterparties, the speculators, assume the price risk in order to 
make a potential profit from bearing the risk. Consequently, the futures market can be 
seen as a market for insurance against price risk. To shed light on the scale of the crude 
oil futures market, the daily volume of futures contracts is 20-fold when compared to 
the physical commodity. In fact, the crude oil futures market is the largest commodity 
futures market in terms of volume. However, this does not risk the sufficient availability 
of the actual crude oil because most of the contracts re closed before the delivery by 
taking the exact opposite position, resulting in a net zero position in the physical 
market. (Garis 2009, 422–424.) 
Despite the futures market, the pricing of commodities fundamentally has demand 
and supply factors behind them. As the global economy grows, it increases the demand 
for crude oil, which translates into increasing oil prices.  Currently, increasing demand 
in emerging economies is one of the most significant demand drives for crude oil as 
well as other commodities. The demand growth especially n China has been of 
significant importance over the last 10–15 years. (Valiante 2013, 282–284.)  Similarly, 
according to the International Energy Association (IEA) (2011), the growth in oil 
demand will remain the highest in Asia where the GDP growth outpaces the rest of the 
world. Consequently, IEA forecasts that the region will account for 75% of the increase 
in the global oil demand. For example, the sudden increase in oil demand from China 
and India in the beginning of the 2000s lowered the global oil reserves. This was a 
typical demand shock that caused both the oil price and the volatility to increase. (Guo 
& Kliesen 2005, 674.) 
The oil industry, including the production, distribution, and refining, is a cyclical 
industry as a whole.  On one hand, when crude oil is trading at low levels, producers 
have very little incentive to invest and expand theinfrastructure. On the other hand, 
when oil is trading at a high price, and the industry is investing, expansion projects take 
about five years to be completed, which cause further price increases. Therefore, there is 
typically too little production capacity to meet the global demand, when the prices are at 
reasonable or low levels, or too much production capa ity to keep the prices at levels 
that allows the expansion investments to remain profitable once they have been 
completed. The cause of the imbalance is that over time the demand function of crude 
oil is a continuously increasing function whereas the supply is non-continuous with 
discrete increases. (Garis 2009, 437.) As a result, the short-term supply schedule of 
crude oil can be very steep depending on the existing reserves available to market and 
production capacity limitations (Barsky & Kilian 2004, 131). 
In addition to production capacity, supply shocks can cause price spikes as well. 
These could be a result of wars, production limitations, and political decisions (Morrell 
& Swan 2006, 725). For example, in both March 1997 and March 1998, OPEC decided 
to cut production in order to put a halt to falling oil prices (Fattouh 2007, 1). The falling 
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oil prices were a result of the financial crisis in Asia and the related negative demand 
shock. Similarly, the Gulf War caused oil prices to soar in the early 1990s. (Barsky & 
Kilian 2004, 127–131.) 
While the fundamental demand and supply drivers form the basis for oil price 
formation over the long-term, the psychological aspects behind the market cannot be 
overlooked. In fact, the psychological aspects dominate the price formation in certain 
instances. For example, the daily oil balance and the views on the volume of surplus 
capacity that could supply the market if needed influence the regime of price discovery. 
When there is consensus that there is sufficient surplus capacity in case of any 
unexpected events, the demand and supply fundamentals dominate. However, if the 
available surplus production capacity falls below some trigger level, the pricing based 
on supply and demand no longer form the basis for price formation. Instead, fear and 
greed take over, and the psychological factors dominate the price behaviour in crude 
markets. In 2007, this psychological trigger level for available surplus production 
capacity was estimated to be 2 million barrels per day. (Garis 2009, 420–430.) 
The market participants in the crude oil futures markets include both hedgers and 
speculators. The hedgers are typically companies that use crude oil or refined oil 
products as an input or companies selling the product – for example, refineries or oil 
distributors. Speculators, on the other hand, do not have any concrete need for crude oil. 
Instead, they try to gain from oil price movements and are therefore willing to bear the 
risk. The speculators include hedge funds that employ leverage in order to even further 
gain exposure to the oil price movements. The actual oil futures transactions are 
executed via traders who work at commodity exchanges. In addition to taking in orders, 
the traders can also act as source of information for the market participants concerning 
the potential future market developments. (Garis 2009, 420–425.) 
In spot markets, future expectations play a significant role in price formation. Even if 
the ex-ante expectations are solely based on one’s own perceptions of other market 
participants’ response to an exogenous event. When t  market participants strongly 
view that a certain event will have certain consequences on the market, they will act 
based on this view. Therefore, the resulting market effects are a consequence of the 
market participants’ own actions based on their ex-ante perceptions, instead of the 
market effects being a result of the actual event even occurring. For example, if there 
are news headlines that the Northeast in the U.S. and Europe, both of which are major 
heating oil consumers, are expected to face an unusually cold winter, the market 
participants expect the price of crude oil to increas  in these markets as a result of 
related demand. In fact, the price oil will likely increase even though there is enough 
surplus capacity to meet the weather-related demand increase because the market 
participants expect the demand to increase during the winter ex-ante. The traders buy 
the oil immediately after the news before its price soars because they assume they will 
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have to pay more for it later on. Consequently, even if there was enough surplus oil 
supply, the resulting oil price increase is a result of market participants’ own buying 
behaviour instead of the actual increase in the demand for the heating oil resulting from 
an exceptionally cold winter. (Garis 2009, 426–427.) 
The tendency of the market to a one-sided view on either upward or downward 
markets exacerbates the phenomenon known as the fallacy of composition in 
economics. According to the phenomenon, individuals that react rationally in response 
to market signals cause instability in the market bcause all the rational market 
participants react similarly to these market signals. For example, if OPEC announces 
that the oil market is sufficiently supplied at current production levels, it is rational 
behaviour to buy crude oil before the price appreciat s. As a result the markets face 
abnormal returns. The price increase is steeper and it levels off at a higher level because 
everyone acted similarly in response to the OPEC’s announcement. (Garis 2009, 433.) 
Commodity markets are highly volatile due to substantial use of leverage, especially 
among speculators, and their relatively short time horizon. This also translates into very 
high sensitivity to news. (Garis 2009, 431.) For example, the ten largest 12-month oil 
futures’ price changes between the April 1983 and December 2004 took place on the 
very days when the Wall Street Journal reported about exogenous shocks. The largest 
daily price changes were in response to news concerning the political instability in the 
Middle East and OPECs production decisions. (Guo & Kliesen 2009, 674.) In fact, it 
has been estimated that the political instability in the Middle East contributed a risk 
premium of USD18–24 for crude oil in 2006 and 2007 (Garis 2009, 422). 
3.3 Unconventional and Alternative Energy Sources 
While conventional crude oil is widely used as a main source for refined petroleum 
products, there are also other products that may plan increasing role in the future. 
These include shale oil and other alternative energy sources. Amid high fuel prices 
during the past few years, technological advances and entrepreneurial take have resulted 
in the introduction of hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”, that facilitates the utilisation of 
shale oil (Gaston 2014).  
Oil shale is fine-grained sedimentary rock that yields substantial amounts of oil and 
combustible gas during destructive distillation. Whether shale oil deposits can be 
developed and are viable depends on several factors. First, there is the location of a 
shale oil reservoir. The geological location of thesource greatly dictates if a deposit can 
be recovered. For example, shale oil can be found from populated areas, parks, or 
wildlife refuges that cannot be entered. However, tchnological advances may allow 
fracking from locations that have been previously unobtainable. Second, the physical 
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and chemical characteristics of the resource are of primary importance in determining 
the viability of shale oil production from particular location. There is a lot of variation 
in the organic content and oil yield of shale oil. The yield can range from 100 to 200 
litres per metric ton of rock. Consequently, U.S. Geological Survey has adapted a lower 
limit of approximately 40 litres per metric ton of rock for oil-shale land classification. 
Ultimately, the availability and price of conventional petroleum dictates if oil-shale 
production and industry are economically viable over th  longer term. At current, only 
few discovered deposits could be mined and processed to oil shale as an economically 
competing alternative to traditional petroleum. Still, some countries that have vast shale 
oil resources but lack petroleum reserves deem it as expedient to invest in and develop 
the oil-shale industry. What is more, the supply of c nventional petroleum is likely to 
diminish in the future, and, therefore, its price will likely increase. As a result, the shale 
oil has the potential to become of much greater importance as a production source of 
electricity, fuel, and other industrial products including petrochemicals. (Dyni 2009, 
77–80.) 
While fossil fuels are currently major sources of fuel in aviation and other 
transportation industries, there have been experimentations using alternative fuels as 
well. According to IATA (2014) 21 airlines had used alternative fuels for a commercial 
flight. In fact, it was only six years ago that such a scenario was considered purely 
hypothetical. When considering alternative fuels for jet kerosene, there had not been 
approved alternatives until the ASTM approved to prduce alternative HEFA fuels, that 
is, fuels made by hydro processing vegetable oils and animal fats. What is more, the 
commercial availability of biofuels is still very limited and, there is no routine 
production of alternative jet fuel. However, there ar  now signals that there would be 
regular production of alternative jet fuel in the nar future. Even though, the technology 
for producing alternative fuels already exists, it is the economics and regulatory policies 
that dictate the feasibility of bio jet fuels. As airlines operate in a highly competitive and 
low-margin industry, it can be expected that biofuels do not overtake conventional fossil 
fuels unless they are cost-competitive with the conventional jet kerosene. The 
competiveness, on short term, could stem from policies that give incentives to produce 
and use alternative jet fuels. (IATA Report on Alternative Fuels 2014). 
In order for alternative biofuels to be viable in replacing the conventional jet fuel in 
large scale, there are several requirements that mus be met. First, the alternative bio 
fuels should be both sustainable and have a smaller carbon footprint when taking into 
consideration other factors, such as production, as well. Second, it is required that 
alternative jet fuels can be mixed with conventional jet fuel and do not require the 
modification or adaptation of aircraft or engines. In addition, it should be possible to 
distribute the alternative jet fuels using the same supply infrastructure as the 
conventional jet fuel. Third, the alternative jet fuels should have similar specifications 
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than the conventional jet fuel in order to be sustainable in use. Especially, the resistance 
to cold should meet the -40°C of Jet A and the -47°C of Jet A-1 standards. What is 
more, the energy density should be at least the 42.8 megajoules per kilogram, that of the 
conventional jet fuel. Obviously, should the energy content be significantly lower, the 
aircrafts could not fly sufficient distances with the same volume of fuel. Consequently, 
automotive bioethanol and biodiesel are not feasible alternatives. Fourth, the alternative 
fuels should meet the sustainability criteria. These include reducing the lifecycle carbon 
emissions, meeting the limited fresh water requirements, not contributing to 
deforestation, and not competing with food production. Such alternative sources of 
biomass that could meet the criteria include camelina crops, switch grass, used cooking 
oils, municipal waste, and algae. Lastly, the main challenges behind large-scale 
adaptation of biofuels are commercial and political, not so much technical. Currently, 
bio fuels are significantly more expensive than conventional kerosene. In addition, 
investment in the production infrastructure is low. Therefore, carefully assessed policies 
are needed to increase the investment in the producti n and development of bio jet 
fuels.  (IATA Fact Sheet: Alternative Fuels 2014.) 
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4 MANAGING FUEL PRICE RISK USING DERIVATIVES 
INSTRUMENTS 
How airlines can employ derivatives contracts in fuel price risk management is 
introduced in this section. Furthermore, how these instruments can mitigate the fuel 
price exposure is explained and further elaborated with examples. The instruments 
discussed here include swap, forward, futures, and option contracts. 
4.1 Swaps 
A swap contract is an agreement in which two parties agree to exchange specified cash 
flows at predetermined intervals in the future (Smith et al. 2003, 354). The term swap 
stems from the nature of the contract itself. Two counterparts entering into the contract, 
that is the buyer and the seller (long and short position), exchange a fixed price at 
present to an unknown floating price in the future. Swap contracts are in legal terms 
purely financial contracts that never go to physical delivery of the underlying asset or 
commodity. Only the cash flows are exchanged. Therefore, swap contracts allow 
companies to take advantage of price movements in the underlying asset that the swap 
price is linked to. In a swap agreement, contract pr ies must agree on the fixed price of 
the underlying and the reference price to which the floating price is linked to. What is 
more, the start and end date must be decided, so ast  have a date when the contract 
becomes effective and when it terminates. Likewise, pricing period must also be agreed 
on, that is, how often the difference between the fix d and the floating price is 
calculated. Lastly, a payment due date is also in the swap contract terms. In commodity 
markets, over-the-counter8 derivatives typically price out on a monthly basis, o even if 
the price difference is calculated on quarterly basis, one third of the contract volume 
will be settled after each month. (James 2003, 15–16.) 
Swap contracts are typically tailor-made contracts that airlines can have, for instance, 
with jet fuel suppliers. For example, an airline can enter into a swap contract that is 
effective for a calendar year. The contract would ensure a fixed-price monthly delivery 
of a specified quantity of jet fuel for the airline. Over the effective time period, the 
realized reference prices are compared to the predetermined fixed swap price. If the 
realized reference price is higher than the fixed price, the fuel supplier pays the 
difference between the fixed and floating price multiplied by the quantity of monthly 
fuel delivery. (Morrell & Swan 2006, 716.) Consequently, only the difference between 
                                                 
8 Over-the-counter instruments are not publicliy listed instruments. Instead, they are tailormade 
agreements between the contract parties. 
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the fixed and floating price is exchanged instead of the notional principal of the contract 
(James 2003, 17). 
There are several types of swaps contracts available for market participants in the 
energy markets. The most basic type of swap contract is the plain vanilla. In a plain 
vanilla swap contract, a floating price of an underlying asset is exchanged to a fixed 
price in the future or vice versa. It is a monthly swap, so the floating price is calculated 
as a monthly average and is then compared to the fixed price. Next, there are differential 
swaps. A differential swap is much like a plain vanilla swap, but instead of a fixed price 
being compared to a floating reference price, it isba ed on a price difference between 
two underlying assets. Therefore, it allows for exchanging a floating price difference, or 
spread, to a fixed difference. For example, the refining margin of jet fuel over crude oil 
could be hedged using a differential swap. In fact, the most popular differential swap 
contract in the oil sector is the Jet Kero versus Ga oil, also known as the regrade swap. 
Then, there are participation swaps that are otherwise similar to plain vanilla swaps, but 
the participation in the unfavourable price differenc  is not 100%. For example, if a 
counterpart buys a fixed price, and the reference is lower, the counterpart only pays an 
agreed percentage of the difference between the fixed and the floating reference price. 
Similarly, a participant selling a fixed price in exchange for floating price does not pay 
100% if the fixed price is lower than the floating reference price. What is more, the 
lower the participation rate, the lower the fixed price quoted for participation swap for a 
seller of fixed price. On the contrary, the lower the participation rate, the higher the 
fixed price for seller of floating price when compared to a normal plain vanilla swap. 
(James 2003, 16–18.) 
Figure 2 illustrates how an airline can use a fixed-price swap contract to hedge 




Figure 2 A fixed price swap contract for hedging jet fuel exposure (James 2003, 178) 
In figure 2, the airline enters into swap contract nd swaps the floating price to a 
fixed price. The counterparty, on the other hand, agrees to receive fixed price instead of 
floating price. For example, the airline buys a fixed price for a monthly jet fuel delivery 
of 50 000 barrels. The contract is effective for a calendar year. The counterparty in the 
swap agreement can be an investment bank, for example, that agrees to receive a fixed 
price in exchange for floating price. The reference price used in the contract is Jet 
Cargoes CIF NWE (cost insurance and freight, North West Europe) price index. The 
reference price, to which the fixed price is compared to, is calculated monthly as the 
arithmetic mean of daily spot price quotations from the Platts price information service 
that provides energy industry information and bench mark prices for commodities. (see 
Schofield 2007, 146.) 
Over the course of the effective contract period the monthly average price is 
calculated for the floating reference price and compared to the fixed price. If the fixed 
price is, for instance, USD40 per barrel of jet keros ne, and the average price for the 
floating Jet Cargoes CIF NWE delivery is more than USD40, the counterparty pays the 
airline the difference multiplied by the contract volume, which was 50 000 barrels in the 
example. On the contrary, the airline pays the difference multiplied by the contract 
volume if the fixed price is higher than the monthly average price for the reference jet 
fuel. Therefore, the net cost for jet fuel for the airline is the jet kerosene spot market 
price ± cash flow from the hedge. (see Schofield 2007, 146 and James 2003, 178–190.) 
Table 1 provides monthly cash flows of the USD40 fixed price jet kerosene swap 
contract from the airline’s point of view. In addition, the total cash flow impact is 
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presented in the table to highlight the net effect of the hedge on fuel price. Note that the 
monthly average prices for Jet Cargoes CIF NEW are fictional and for illustrative 
purposes only. 









Settlement $  
Jan 50 000 40 38 -100000 
Feb 50 000 40 39 -50000 
Mar 50 000 40 42 100000 
May 50 000 40 43 150000 
Jun 50 000 40 41 50000 
Jul 50 000 40 40 0 
Aug 50 000 40 39 -50000 
Sep 50 000 40 39 -50000 
Oct 50 000 40 42 100000 
Nov 50 000 40 41 50000 
Dec 50 000 40 40 0 
Total 550 000 barrels $ 200000 
 
From table 1 we can observe that the monthly settlement varies depending only on 
the monthly floating reference price. In January the monthly average price is USD38, 
and the fixed price the airline bought stands at USD40. Therefore, the airline pays the 
difference USD2 multiplied by the contract volume to the counterparty in addition to 
physical spot market price. For example, in January the net cash flow from the hedge 
for the airline is as follows: 38 − 40
		 ∗ 50	000	 =
−100	000 so the airline pays the counterparty USD100 000. On the contrary, the 
airline receives 42 − 40
		 ∗ 50	000	 = 100	000 in 
October from the hedge. This, in turn, is paid by the counterparty. The total effect of the 
swap contract for the airline’s cash flows is positive by USD200 000 over the course of 
the hedge. 
In the commodities market, it is of common practice to derive the price of jet fuel 
from the price of gasoil or heating oil. This due to fact that both distilled products are 
refined from crude oil and have similar product characteristics. Typically, the price of 
jet kerosene is the price of gasoil or heating oil with a premium on top because the 
product quality requirements are stricter for jet fuel than heating oil or gasoil. Airlines, 
however, can hedge themselves against the divergence of the two prices using the 
differential swap contract. The differential swap fixes the jet fuel premium over the 
heating oil, and the fixed price is then compared to the floating price difference between 
the two products. (Schofield 2007, 146–147.) 
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4.2 Futures 
A futures contract is a commitment to buy or sell an sset in the future at a 
predetermined price. Futures are standardized contracts that are traded on exchanges 
such as Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). A 
counterpart agreeing to buy an asset in the future at a predetermined price has a long 
position. On the contrary, a counterpart committing o selling an asset in the future at a 
specified price has a short position. The agreed price is the current futures price of the 
underlying asset for future delivery at a given date. (Hull 2009, 6, 21–22.) 
In a standardized energy futures contract, the follow details are specified (James 
2003, 34–35): 
• Underlying asset: the energy commodity or price index to which the contract is 
based on 
• Contract size: the volume of the underlying in one futures contract 
• Delivery cycle: the months for which the contract can be traded 
• Expiration date: the date on which the trading month of the contract in 
question will cease to exist and all the related obligations will terminate 
• Grade or quality specification of the underlying and the delivery location: a 
detailed description of the energy commodity or other underlying in question 
including higher or lower quality and its alternate d livery locations available 
at a premium or discount 
• Settlement: the terms for physical delivery or cash settlement of the futures 
contract (typically the unit price is the only non-standard feature of a futures 
contract) 
There are also other predetermined limits on several futures contracts. Many 
contracts have price limits on the daily price movements. Should a futures contract price 
decrease from the previous trading day by an amount equal to the daily price limit, the 
contract would be limit down. Likewise, should the contract’s price soar by the amount 
of daily price limit, the contract would end up being limit up. Once a limit move is 
reached, the trading is typically ceased for the day. Despite the limits, the exchange has, 
in some instances, the authority to intervene and change the limits. The price limits 
prevent large price moves resulting from speculative excesses. In addition to price 
changes, there are limits to the size of the position one can have in a given contract. The 
size limits are aimed at preventing the speculators fr m exercising excessive influence 
on the market. (Hull 2009, 25.) 
In exchange traded futures contracts, hedgers need ot to bear any counterparty risk. 
This due to the fact that the clearing house of the exchange guarantees the performance 
of the contracts traded on the exchange. This is possible because the clearing house 
requires counterparts to deposit an initial margin in a margin account that typically 
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amounts to about 10% of the notional value of the futures contract. (James 2003, 13, 
35.) At the end of every trading day, the positions f the counterparties are adjusted to 
reflect the gain or loss from the futures contract. This marking-to-market is done by 
adjusting the balances between the margin accounts. If he balance on the margin 
account falls below the maintenance margin, the investor is required to top up the 
margin account. This is known as the variance margin. Conversely, if the balance on the 
margin account is above the maintenance margin due to favourable price movements, 
any excess balance can be withdrawn from the account. (Hull 2009, 26–27.) If one is 
using a broker to execute the trading, the broker will do these daily settlements given 
that the customer has a credit line (James 2013, 13). 
Airlines typically take long position when hedging a ainst fuel price risk with futures 
contracts. A long position is ideal for a company that must buy a commodity in the 
future and the price of which it wants lock in befor hand. (Hull 2009, 47.) Futures 
contracts on jet kerosene are only available on the Tokyo Commodities Exchange 
(TOCOM) and the open interest on these contracts is rather low (Morrel 2007, 191). In 
addition, these contracts are denominated in Japanese y n. Therefore, airlines employ 
oil or gasoil futures in hedging the price risk of jet kerosene. (Cobbs & Wolf 2004, 3.) 
For example, gasoil is widely used in hedging because of its high correlation with the 
price of jet kerosene (Rao 1999, 39). Furthermore, the price of jet fuel has been tracking 
the price of crude oil as well (Morrell 2007, 191). 
Airlines are exposed to basis risk when managing fuel price risk with futures. It is 
possible that the spot price and the futures price are not moving in tandem. The basis 
can be defined as the difference between the spot price and the futures price of the 
underlying at any time t. The basis risk can be related to time basis and product basis. If 
there is not a futures contract available on the underlying, the product basis risk arises. 
Likewise, if the hedged position must be closed out before its maturity, it can cause a 
time basis risk. Therefore, one must consider carefully which underlying asset to use in 
the futures contract. Typically, the futures price and spot price of the underlying 
converge toward the expiry of the futures contract. (Hull 2009, 51–53.) Consequently, 
the market is said to be in contango when the price for prompt delivery of the 
commodity is lower than that for deferred delivery. Conversely, the market is in 
backwardation when the price of prompt delivery is higher than the future delivery of 
the commodity. (Bellalah 2009, 7–8.) When entering to the futures contract, the 
current spot price, the current futures price and maturity are known, so the future basis 
is the only unknown variable in the hedge. For long hedges that airlines typically have, 
the unexpected strengthening of the basis worsens the hedger’s position. In contrast, the 
unexpected weakening of the basis benefits the owner of the long position.  (Hull 2009 
51–53.)  
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In practice, airlines hedge jet fuel price risk using futures with other underlying 
commodities than jet kerosene. Consequently, they ar  engaged in a practice known as 
cross hedging. (Hull 2009, 55.) This, in turn, exposes the airlines to basis risk because 
the underlying commodity and jet fuel do not have a perfect correlation (Cobbs & Wolf 
2004, 3). Only the jet kerosene futures truly, fully reflect the price changes in jet fuel 
prices (Morrell 2007, 191). Therefore, the hedger must consider the hedge ratio, that is, 
the size of position taken in the futures contracts in relation to the size of the underlying 
exposure in the physical commodity market. If the underlying exposure being hedged 
and the underlying of the futures contract are the same asset or commodity, it is natural 
to employ a hedge ratio of one. However, in the case of cross hedging, the hedge ratio 
of one may not yield the optimal result. (Hull 2009, 54–55.) 
In cross hedging, the optimal hedge ratio, denoted as h*, is the minimum variance 






Where  is the standard deviation of spot price changes of the underlying,  the 
standard deviation of the futures price changes, and  the correlation coefficient 
between the spot and futures price changes. If the correlation coefficient between the 
futures and spot price changes is one, then ℎ∗ yields 1.0. However, if the correlation 
coefficient remains constant at 1.0, but 2 = , then optimal hedge ration would be 
0.5 (Hull 2009, 54–55.) 
Let us assume that an airline chooses to hedge its fuel consumption for May with 
gasoil futures. The futures price for May gasoil deivery stands now at USD0.80 per 
gallon. At the end of April, the airline closes out its future position. At that moment the 
spot price of jet fuel is USD1.10 per gallon and the futures price of gasoil is USD0.95 
per gallon. Consequently, the airline pays the spotprice of the jet fuel that is USD1.10 
per gallon and gains USD0.15 per gallon [ 0.95 − 0.80
/ !" ] on the futures 
contract. As a result, the airline pays USD0.95 per gallon net for its May jet fuel 
delivery, that is 1.10 − 0.15
/ !" = 0.95/ !", for the part that was 
hedged with the futures contract. The net cost of jet fuel is therefore USD0.15 below the 
physical spot price. 
The benefit of the futures contacts is that the hedger is not exposed to counter party 
risk. That is, that the counterparty would fail to meet its obligation. This is because the 
clearing house of the exchange guarantees the performance of the futures contracts 
traded on the exchange. What is more, the pricing of the futures contracts is transparent 
since they are quoted on the stock exchange. (James 2003, 13.) In addition, the 
standardized futures contracts traded on exchanges are highly liquid. However, for very 
long maturities, only crude oil futures have good liquidity and open interest. 
Consequently, there are crude oil futures available for monthly delivery up to two years’ 
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maturity, and thereafter, for biannual deliveries with maturities of up to three years. 
(Morrel & Swan 2006, 716–717.) What is more, the futures contracts typically do not 
go into physical delivery. Instead, most of the futures contracts are settled in cash before 
the delivery by taking the exact opposite position n the futures contract. Therefore, 
most of the futures contracts result in being net-zero in the physical underlying 
commodity. This is especially the case with the crude oil futures contracts, where the 
volume of the futures contracts is many fold when compared to actual physical 
deliveries.  (Garis 2009, 422–424.)  
4.3 Forwards 
Forward contracts are used to establish a price of a c mmodity for a future date and also 
to secure supply of a commodity. A forward contract is a tailor-made, bilateral 
agreement for the two parties entering into the contract. The bilateral agreement 
specifies the terms of the forward contract, such as the underlying commodity, the 
forward price paid at maturity, the terms for delivry and receipt, and the settlement of 
the payment. Long position in a forward contract implies that the party takes the 
delivery of the commodity, whereas the short positin translates into selling and 
delivering the commodity. In the hedging context, a long forward position is taken so as 
to lock in the future price, and to remove uncertainty about the future cash flows 
regarding the commodity purchase. (Evans & Hunt 2009, 7 6.) Forwards are typically 
bilateral agreements and they are not traded on exchange. Therefore, they are over-the-
counter (OTC) contracts (Morrell 2007, 190.) 
Forward contracts are not standardized contracts, so the terms can be freely discussed 
and determined between the contract parties. The expiry of the contract and, therefore, 
the delivery time must be agreed on. Typically, it is one predetermined date in the future 
instead of several delivery dates or periods. What is more, the contract parties’ positions 
are not marked to market daily. Instead, the settlement takes place at the expiry of the 
contract. The position are settled with either physical delivery of the commodity or cash 
settlement. (Hull 2009, 39.) 
Airlines can also use forward contracts in hedging against the fuel price risk. They 
can enter into a forward contract with fuel suppliers such as Air BP. In forward 
contracts, the contract parties must bear full counterparty risk. Consequently, it is 
possible that the other party in the contract faces bankruptcy before the maturity of the 
forward contract. (Morrell 2007, 190.) In addition, OTC contracts typically lack price 
transparency because they are not quoted on exchanges unlike listed contracts such as 
futures. (James 2003, 14). Therefore, exiting the position in a forward contract is 
difficult. One must find an entity with the exact same needs concerning the commodity, 
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maturity, and quantity as well as the delivery location. What is more, due to the 
counterparty risk, neither party can simply give thir position to some other party. 
Instead, they must first get an approval from the initial contract party, and it cannot be 
taken for granted. (Evans & Hunt 2009, 706.) 
Recently, however, clearing houses have begun to accept OTC contracts in to their 
guarantee systems. Therefore, the distinction between the on-exchange and over-the-
counter contracts has become more ambiguous. As a re ult, the bilateral contracts can 
be transferred to clearing houses. Consequently, the clearing house acts a counterparty 
in the contract for both the long and short position holders, that is, the clearing house 
acts as the central counterpart in the contract. The exposure to the original counterparty 
risk can be significantly reduced by transferring the contract to a clearing house. Despite 
this, clearing houses have not been used in significa t amounts in the oil market, and the 
development has been very gradual. However, newer gas and energy markets have 
adopted this procedure, which has led to greater price transparency because now parties 
can see the prices from their computer terminals much like in the futures market. (James 
2009, 14.) In the case of airlines, forward contracts are typically tailored for each 
airlines’ specific requirements. This, in turn, means that they are not very appealing 
instruments for third parties or speculators. (Morrell & Swan 2006, 715–716.) 
Using a forward contract to hedge against fuel price sk is rather straight forward. 
Let us assume that an airline enters into a forward contract with a jet fuel supplier. The 
airline agrees to buy 100 000 gallons of jet fuel three months into the future at USD1.50 
per gallon. After three months, when the contract expir s, the spot price for jet fuel 
stands at USD1.80 per gallon. Therefore, airline gains USD0.30 per gallon on the 
hedge, that is USD1.80 − 1.50
/ !" = 0.30/ !". The airline pays 
USD150 000 for the fuel delivery of 100 000 gallons, that is 100	000	 !" ∗
1.50/ !". Had the company not entered the hedge, it would have paid 
USD180 000 for the fuel delivery. On the contrary, had the spot price been below the 
agreed forward price, the airline would have made a loss on the hedge. 
4.4 Options 
Options are different from other derivatives instruments discussed thus far. An option 
gives a right to buy or sell the underlying in the future for a predetermined price, but the 
owner of the option is not obligated to exercise thoption. (Hull 2009, 179.) On the 
contrary, the writer of the option faces an obligation if the buyer of the option chooses 
to exercise the option (Evans & Hunt 2009, 707). A call option gives a right to buy the 
asset at a predetermined strike price, whereas, the put option gives a right to sell the 
asset at a predetermined strike price. (Hull 2009, 179.) There are both European and 
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American options available. The difference is the flexibility concerning the exercise 
time. An American option can be exercised at any time n the future up until the expiry 
of the contract. In contrast, the European option ca  only be exercised on the expiration 
date, not at any time before the expiry. Thus, American options provide more flexibility. 
(Keown et al. 2011, 662.) 
Options are also different from other derivatives in truments because one must pay a 
premium for options (Evans & Hunt 2009, 707). Black & Scholes (1973) developed the 
famous formula for pricing European options. According to their model the premium 
paid for an option depends on the strike price, the expected price volatility of the 
underlying, maturity, risk free interest rate, and the spot price of the underlying asset. 
Typically, American style option premiums are higher than the European options due to 
the higher flexibility on the exercise date. (James 2003, 21–23.) 
It is possible to acquire options both on exchange and over-the-counter. Energy 
options provide energy consumers with an opportunity to hedge against energy price 
risk for a premium. In practice, companies that useen rgy commodities as an input in 
significant amounts, can set a maximum price (a cap) that they are willing to pay for the 
commodity over a given time period. This can be achieved by buying a call option at 
this cap strike price. In contrast, the issuer of the call option is obligated to deliver the 
quantity specified in the option at a given date in exchange for the option premium 
should the holder of the option wish to exercise its r ght. In practice, however, vast 
majority of the option contracts never go into physical delivery of the commodity. 
Instead, the positions are typically settled with cash. Therefore, the option holders 
typically benefit from the corresponding cash flows. While actual trading of the 
commodities takes place in the physical spot markets. (James 2003, 107.) 
Airlines can acquire options in jet fuel from the over-the-counter market in addition 
to more heavily traded commodities. The counterparty in hese option contracts may be, 
for example a bank. What is more, options provide airlines with more flexibility 
concerning the future prices because they provide protection against price increases 
over the option strike price, but at the same time allow them to benefit from decreasing 
fuel prices. However, there is the option premium that must be paid up front for the 
flexibility and protection that the option contracts provide. (Morrell 2007, 190.) 
The payoff from option contracts is dependent on the premium paid for the option as 
well as the spot price of the commodity at the expiration of the contract. Figure 3 
illustrates the payoff diagram.  
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Figure 3 Payoff diagram for a $100 long call (see Keown et al. 2009, 663) 
The payoff diagram in Figure 3 is for a long call opti n that is used to hedge against 
the price of crude rising above USD100 per barrel. The option premium for the call 
option is USD5. Therefore, the payoff from the hedge is USD5 negative up until the 
break-even point of USD105. If the spot price at the expiry of the contract is below 
USD100 per barrel, the hedger foregoes the option because the spot price in the physical 
market is more affordable. Although, the strike price s USD100, the premium paid for 
the option must also be covered in order for the hedge to break even. Onwards from the 
USD105 threshold, the payoff is positive and increases linearly. 
Option contracts can also be used to structure various type of payoffs, and different 
risk profiles can be constructed using options. In the energy and commodity markets, a 
popular option structure among companies that use significant amounts of energy as an 
input is a collar structure. (James 2003, 117.) In addition, the collar structure has 
become more and more popular among airlines as well part y due to the fact that it helps 
covering the option premiums paid for the call optins. In a collar structure, an airline 
sets a price cap for the fuel price by acquiring a call option for a premium. In addition, 
the airline writes a put option with a strike price lower than the strike price of the 
acquired call option. By writing a put option, the airline foregoes the ability to benefit 
from fuel prices below the strike price of the put option. However, the airliner receives 
the option premium from the written put option that, in turn, is used to cover at least 
part of the acquired call option. Therefore, the net cost for the collar structure is the 
difference between the premium paid for price cap and the premium received from the 
written put option. As a result, the airline can lock in the price of jet fuel between two 
known values with less cash paid upfront when compared to a simple long call position. 
(Morrell & Swan 2006, 716.) In fact, it is possible to construct a costless collar 
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structure. In such case, an airline acquires a longcall option and writes a sufficient 
amount of put options, or a put option with a high enough strike price, so that the cash 
flow received from the written put option(s) covers the entire premium paid for the call 
option. This particular structure is known as zero-cost collar or costless collar. (James 
2003, 117.) 




Figure 4 A collar structure in airlines (James 2003, 191) 
In figure 4, the airline acquires a call option with a strike price of USD100 and pays 
a premium for it. The call sets the cap for the cost of jet fuel at USD100 per barrel. 
Simultaneously, the airline writes a put option(s) with a strike price of USD80 to the 
extent that the premiums received from the option(s) covers the premium that must be 
paid for the call option. Should the price of jet fuel increase above the USD100 per 
barrel cap, the airline exercises its option, and the net cost for the fuel stands at 
USD100. However, if the spot price of jet fuel is between the cap and the floor, that is 
USD80 and USD100 per barrel, the airline foregoes its call option and pays the current 
spot price. Lastly, in the event of spot prices falling below the USD80 per barrel floor, 
the airline must pay the USD80 per barrel because the owner of the put option exercises 
its right to sell at USD80 that is above the current spot market price. 
Figure 5 exhibits the payoff form the zero-cost collar structure with a USD100 per 
barrel call option and written put option at USD80 per barrel. 
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Figure 5 Payoff from a zero-cost collar  
From figure 5, it can be seen how the net cost of jet uel is locked in between the 
USD100 cap and the USD80 floor. On the horizontal axis is the spot price of jet fuel, 
and on the vertical axis is the payoff from the collar structure. When the price is 
between the two values, the airline pays the spot market price. However, when the spot 
is above the USD100, the airline pays the spot price less the payoff from the hedge 
resulting in net cost of USD100 per barrel. Should the spot price of jet fuel fall below 
the USD80 per barrel at maturity, the counterparty would exercise its put option that the 
airline had written. The airline still pays the spot rice in the physical market, but pays 
the counterparty the difference between the put options’ strike price and the spot price. 
Therefore, the net cost for the airline is the spot rice plus the payoff for the 
counterparty. By issuing put option, the airline finances the call option. However, at the 
same time, the airline foregoes the potential to benefit from spot prices lower than the 
strike price of the written put option. 
The benefit of options for energy consumers is that t e cash flows are limited only to 
the premium paid for the option, in the case of over-th -counter options. For example, 
an airline can hedge against rising jet fuel prices without giving in the opportunity to 
benefit from falling fuel prices. (James 2003, 108.) However, the OTC options pose a 
counterparty risk. (Morrell 2007, 191.) Whereas, the options traded on exchange do not 
pose the counterparty risk, but participants are requi d to deposit a margin, like in the 
case of futures contracts, that is about 10% of the notional value of option contracts. 
These initial margins are settled on a daily basis to reflect the changes in the contract 
parties’ positions. What is more, the contract parties are also required to deposit an 
additional variation margin should the initial margin turn out to be insufficient. (James 
2003, 23–24.) As a result, not all the airlines canenter into abovementioned derivatives 
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contracts due to difficulties in gaining access to credit limits (Asian Airlines Wrestle – – 
2004). 
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5 EMPIRICAL PART 
5.1 Methodology 
To study and understand the jet fuel price exposure and the means to hedge against this 
particular price risk, a combination of qualitative and quantitative research is undertaken 
in the thesis. The research paradigm in the thesis is therefore mixed methods research. 
Caracelli, Graham, and Greene (1989) first introduce  mixed methods research as a 
study that includes one qualitative method and one quantitative method. However, the 
number of quantitative and qualitative methods in the research is not limited to one; 
there can be several of them. Later Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007) 
constructed a better, and more defined consensus definition by evaluating the 19 
definitions of the 21 published mixed-methods researchers. They concluded that mixed 
methods research allows a researcher to combine elements of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to the research in order to come up with breadth and depth of 
understanding as well as corroboration. 
Currently, instead of a single definition, more emphasis is given to the definition of 
core characteristics in mixed methods research. Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, 5–6) 
have concluded these core characteristics of the mixed methods research, and it 
combines not only methods but also a philosophy and research design as well. In a 
mixed methods approach the researcher collects and analyses both quantitative and 
qualitative data and mixes both categories of data by embedding one with another, or by 
sequentially building one over the other form of data. What is more, the researcher can 
give priority to only one form of data depending on what the emphasis of the study is. 
Then, these procedures are framed with philosophical worldviews and theoretical 
lenses. Therefore, the mixed methods research provides an ideal approach for this 
thesis. The quantitative analysis provides evidence with regards to the jet fuel price 
exposure, and the most appropriate approach to analyse the exposure is through 
regression analysis. However, should the results be unexpected, the researcher still has 
the qualitative analysis that can possibly provide reasoning concerning the quantitative 
results. Thus, employing qualitative methods in addition to quantitative analysis can 
further enhance the breadth and depth of the studied ph nomenon. For example, should 
the regression analysis provide insignificant exposure as a result, the qualitative analysis 
of the jet fuel hedging practices may suggest that t e hedging is in fact effective to such 
an extent that there remains no or very little exposure to the jet fuel price risk. 
In the thesis, the researcher, on one hand, studies the extent of the jet fuel price 
exposure, and, on the other hand, how the jet fuel price risk is managed in Nordic 
countries’ listed airlines that are relatively small in size when compared to the global 
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aviation context. The Nordic countries’ listed airlines where chosen as the sample since 
they are all quite small on a global scale. What is more, they are all based in the same 
region and faced with similar regional competition that adds to the homogeneity of the 
sample airlines. Lastly, and most importantly, there is no previous research concerning 
the Nordic countries airlines to the knowledge of the researcher. Therefore, the research 
provides evidence from the Nordic countries with regards to jet fuel price exposure and 
hedging practices.  
The paradigm typically implied with quantitative approach is postpositivism. The 
postpositivist worldview may be used in seeking knowledge based on detailed measures 
and observations of variables. (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 41.) Therefore, to study 
the jet fuel price exposure, a quantitative approach with this paradigm provides the 
researcher with adequate tools to assess whether or not any significant exposure can be 
found among the sample airlines. When assessing the extent of the exposure, the interest 
is in the stock returns of the publicly traded Nordic Countries’ airlines: to what extent 
does jet fuel price returns affect the returns of the airline stocks in the Nordic countries? 
In the quantitative part, the exposure is measured by building an regression analysis 
with using the overall local stock market index as the control variable. 
Quantitative research cannot explain cultural and social construction of the variables 
that are studied. Hence, qualitative research aims at understanding reality and 
phenomena as socially constructed. Therefore, qualitative approach is typically 
employed to interpret and understand a phenomenon, while the quantitative approach is 
concerned with explanation, statistical analysis, and testing of hypotheses. (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen 2008, 5.) Qualitative business research typically aims at answering to 
questions such as what, how, and why. Likewise, the qualitative research aims at 
thoroughly describing and exploring situations, states and processes. What is more, it is 
characteristic of qualitative business research to answer or explain phenomena in 
qualitative terms. Therefore, it aims at shaping the understanding of the phenomenon at 
hand and offers explanations as to why states, situations, and processes are such as they 
are. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 44.) Consequently, to understand how airlines in the 
Nordic countries manage fuel price risk, a qualitative ake is appropriate to explain and 
understand the fuel price risk management practices of the Nordic countries’ listed 
airlines. The thesis strives to answer how the airlines hedge against the fuel price risk. 
What is more, the hedging practices will be described and explored thoroughly, so as to 
enhance understanding of the phenomenon in question. 
While the ontological worldview in quantitative research is typically objectivism, 
qualitative research is often concerned with a subjective worldview known as 
constructionism. In objectivism it is assumed that the reality and social world exists 
independent of people, actions, and activities. Therefore, the reality exists without the 
researcher.  On the contrary, in constructionism, social actors through interaction 
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produce the reality. This implies that the social actors can change their views and 
perceptions both through interaction and over time. What is more, the reality is also 
influenced by the researcher’s subjective views and interpretations. (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen 2008, 8–9.) Therefore, the researcher must acknowledge all these factors 
when analysing and interpreting the qualitative data, nd more importantly realize, that 
achieving complete objectivism is not really quite feasible. 
The research design in the thesis follows an explanatory sequential design. In mixed 
methods research, the explanatory sequential design is constructed in a way that first the 
quantitative data is gathered and analysed. Then, the qualitative data is collected and 
analysed. After these research phases, follows the in erpretation of the results. In both 
phases, the respective research questions are answered. Lastly, both results are 
interpreted, and the researcher analyses how the qualitative results could help explaining 
the quantitative results. (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 68–71.) This research design is 
suitable for the thesis, as the qualitative research could provide reasoning for the 
quantitative results should some unexpected results arise from the quantitative analysis. 
Likewise, the level of interaction between the qualitative and quantitative strands in the 
thesis is independent. Independent level of interacion means that the researcher 
conducts both the quantitative and qualitative research independently. This implies to 
the data collection and analysis. It is only at the time of interpreting the results that the 
distinct strands are mixed and the overall interpretation is done. (Creswell & Plano 
Clark 2011, 64.)  
In addition, the point of interface in the thesis follows the approach of mixing during 
the interpretation. It means that the two methods are mixed in the interpretation which is 
the final stage of the research process after the res archer has collected, analysed and 
reported the results from both sets of data. (Graswell & Plano Clark 2011, 66.) This 
research design is appropriate for the thesis since the quantitative and qualitative data 
are collected irrespective of each other. Then, the quantitative data is modelled and 
analysed using the regression analysis. After that, t e qualitative data is analysed and 
the respective research questions answered. Finally, the qualitative data and analysis 
may provide some reasoning when interpreting the ovrall results of the quantitative 
data. 
The qualitative part in the thesis is conducted as an extensive case study research. In 
extensive case study, the focus is on issues that can be studied by using several cases. 
The interest is in elaborating, investigating, and explaining a phenomenon. Therefore, 
not any individual company is of specific interest per se for the study. What is more, the 
companies in the study should either be similar enough in order to generate new 
knowledge or diverse enough to facilitate meaningful comparisons and there should be 
four to ten companies. Furthermore, the empirical data collected from the companies in 
an extensive case study should be similar enough in order for the researcher to able to 
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describe and explain the phenomenon of interest. In contrast to intensive case study, the 
extensive case study approach produces rather thin descriptions of the case companies. 
The cases are not studied in high level of detail because the researcher has a predefined 
interest for the research. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 127—131.) The extensive case 
study approach is appropriate for the qualitative part because the interest lies in 
understanding a phenomenon within a group of rather homogenous companies. Instead 
of exhaustingly studying one case, four companies are analysed and similar data 
gathered form the companies in order to elaborate and understand the phenomenon of 
hedging against jet fuel price risk in the Nordic countries’ listed airlines.  
In the thesis both primary and secondary sources of data are employed. The data used 
in the quantitative part is gather from the Datastream database, which is secondary data. 
The data includes stock price data of the sample airlines as well as market index data. In 
the qualitative part, there is a combination of primary and secondary data, the emphasis 
being on the latter one. The secondary data is collected from the airlines’ financial 
statements, interim reports and annual reports. These include plenty of data with regards 
to financial risks that the airlines face, including the fuel price risk. What is more, there 
is information about the risk management policies in place and the extent to which the 
airlines are hedged against fuel price exposure. Likewise, information about the 
derivatives instruments used in the hedging can be found from the financial statements 
and annual reports.  
On top of gathering the data from financial statements and annual reports, there is 
primary data gathered in the form of an interview. The researcher interviewed an 
industry practitioner involved in the hedging and financial risk management of the 
Finnish flag carrier Finnair. The interview was semi-structured in form and the 
questions were mostly open-ended. Semi-structured int rviews are a type of qualitative 
interview in which topics, issues, and themes are discussed. The semi-structured 
interviews typically provide answers to questions that are in form of both what and how. 
The advantage of semi-structured interview is that it llows for the interviewer to vary 
wording and sequence of questions. Although, the int rview is rather systematic, the 
tone during the interview can be informal and conversational. On one hand, the semi-
structured take allows the interviewee to highlight and raise topics and important views 
that are not guided by the interviewer. On the other hand, this interview type allows the 
interviewer to obtain additional, in-depth information. Lastly, open-ended questions 
provide the interviewee with more take on what is di cussed in the interview and 
usually this produces more detailed responses to the questions and topics. (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen 2008, 85–89.) Conducting an additional iterview, in addition to secondary 
data (financial statements and annual reports), should provide the research with valuable 
information and tacit knowledge. The researcher views that the interview will further 
elaborate the reasoning and decisions behind the risk management and hedging 
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5.2 Nordic Listed Airlines Overview 
5.2.1 Finnair 
Finnair is the Finnish flag carrier based in Helsinki-Vantaa airport and it is one of the 
oldest operating airlines in the world. The company specializes in flights between Asia 
and Europe and aims at providing the smoothest connections in the northern hemisphere 
via its hub in Helsinki. Finnair Group consists of two business areas: Airline Business 
and Travel Services. At the end of June 2014, the Finnish government was the largest 
shareholder with 55.8% of the company’s shares. (Finnair Group.) 
The company flies to more than 70 destinations in Finland, Europe, Middle-East, 
Asia, and North-America. As a member of oneworld alliance, the network is further 
enhanced by code-share routes with the alliance members and bilateral agreements. In 
addition, Finnair operates leisure flights to approximately 60 destinations depending on 
the tour operators’ programs and season. (Finnair Group.)  
Finnair operates a fleet of 45 planes of which it owns 22 and has leased 23 aircraft. 
20 of those are on operational leasing and three on fina cial leasing. The average age of 
the fleet stood at 10.2 years at the end of 2014. In addition, Finnair has orders on 19 
Airbus A350 wide-body aircrafts with which it plans to replace the existing Airbus 
A340 wide-bodies. The company also owns another 22 narrow-body (single-aisle) 
aircraft that are operated by Flybe Finland mainly on domestic and European routes. 
(Finnair Financial Statements 2014.) 
During the year 2014, the company carried 9.63 million passengers with a load 
factor9 of 80.2%, and the turnover for 2014 was €2.285 billion. The company’s capacity 
was 30 889 million available seat kilometers (ASK10), and it flew 24 772 million 
revenue passenger kilometers (RPK11). Fuel expenditures for the year 2014 where 28% 
of the total operating expenses. Cost per available seat kilometer (CASK) was €0.0637 
while the CASK excluding fuel stood at €0.0431. (Finnair Financial Statements 2014.) 
                                                 
9 Load factor measures how effectively an airline has managed to sell available seats on its flights. 
10 ASK is the number of available seats times the kilometres flown in a given time period. 
11 RPK is the distance traveled by paying customers in a given period. 
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At the end of 2014, Finnair employed a total of 4 981 employees of which 3 772 where 
working at the Airline Business (Finnair Annual Report 2014.) 
5.2.2 Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) 
Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) is the flag carrier of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. SAS 
is listed on the Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen exchanges. The company aims at 
being the leading airline in the Scandinavia. SAS state  that its main focus in on short-
haul flights and it aims at being the airline for the frequent Scandinavian flyers. (SAS 
Annual Report 2013/2014.) 
The company is 50% owned by the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian governments. 
The Swedish Government Offices has a 21.4% stake, Danish Statens Administration 
(FSC) has 14.3%, and the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries poses 
14.3% of the shares as well. (SAS Annual Report 2013/2014.) 
SAS flies to 125 destinations globally. The destinations are in Europe, United States, 
and Asia. The airline is a member of the Star Alliance. The membership enhances the 
destinations available to customers flying. SAS operated a fleet of 138 aircraft at the 
end of the October 2014 with an average age of 11.2 years. Of the 138 operated aircraft, 
39 are owned and 99 are on lease. The company has also ordered 12 Airbus wide-bodies 
and another 30 Airbus A320 NEOs that will be delivered between the years 2015 and 
2021. In addition, SAS has leased out nine narrow bdy aircrafts, and another four are 
being parked. (SAS Annual Report 2013/2014.) 
During its fiscal year 2013/2014, Scandinavian airlines carried 28.4 million 
passengers, creating a turnover of SEK38 billion (~€4.07billion). The load factor stood 
at 74.9% for the fiscal 2013/2014. Fuel costs accounted to 23.3% of the total operating 
expenses. Total available seat kilometers where 45 158 million kilometers, and for the 
scheduled traffic ASK was 40 971 million kilometers. Total revenue passenger 
kilometers for the fiscal was 34 714 million kilometers and the total unit cost was 
SEK0.75 (~€0.0804). The average number of employees in the service during the fiscal 
amounted to 12 329.  (SAS Annual Report 2013/2014.) 
5.2.3 Norwegian Air Shuttle 
Norwegian Air Shuttle is a low-cost carrier based in Norway. Norwegian Air Shuttle is 
the second largest carrier in the Scandinavia. The company aims at offering competitive 
and low-fare flight services for customers. The company is listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. (Norwegian Air Shuttle – Our Company 2014.) The largest shareholders of 
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Norwegian Air Shuttle are HBK Invest AS (27.02%), the Government Pension Fund of 
Norway (Folketrygdfondet) (6.94%), and Skagen vekst, an equity fund, (4.12%). 
(Norwegian Annual Report 2013.) 
The company flies to 130 destinations. The destinatio s are in Europe, the United 
States, North Africa, the Middle East, and Thailand. Norwegian Air Shuttle is not 
currently a member of any airline alliance. (Norwegian – Our Company 2014.) The 
company currently has 17 operational bases in Europe, the United States, and in 
Thailand. The number of employees working for the company is approximately 4 500. 
(Norwegian Air Shuttle Corporate Fact Sheet.) These include also non-permanent staff 
such apprentices, hired staff, and hired pilots. At the end of the fiscal 2014 the number 
of full-time equivalent employees was 4 314. (Norwegian Annual Report 2014.)  
Norwegian Air Shuttle operates a fleet of 95 aircrafts. The fleet is all Boeing and 
consists of 84 Boeing 737-800, 5 Boeing 737-300, and 7 Boeing 787-8 Dremliner wide-
bodies. In January 2012, the company placed orders for 222 narrow-body aircrafts. In 
addition, the company has ordered 17 more Boeing 787-8 Dreamliners to its long-haul 
fleet. (Norwegian Fleet 2015.) The average age of the fleet was 4.2 years at the end of 
the fiscal 2013 (Norwegian Annual Report 2014). 
In 2014, Norwegian Air Shuttle carried a total of 24 million passengers (Norwegian 
Our – Company 2014). During its fiscal year 2014 the revenue was NOK19.540 billion 
(~€2.328 billion). Available seat kilometres stood at 46 479 million, while the revenue 
passenger kilometres amounted to 37 615 million. The load factor for the fiscal was 
80.9%. The unit cost per available seat kilometre (CASK) was NOK0.42 (€0.05) while 
the CASK excluding fuel was NOK0.29 (€0.0345). (Norwegian Annual Report 2014.) 
5.2.4 Icelandair Group 
Icelandair Group is operating in the international airline and tourism sectors. The 
company is based in Iceland, and the business concept is built on the airlines’ route 
network. Icelandair Group’s main focus is to operat flights to and from Europe and 
North America via its Reykjavik hub in Iceland. The largest shareholders are the 
Pension Fund of Commerce (14.58%), and an investment fund Stefnir - ÍS 15 (11.07%). 
All other shareowners pose a share of less than ten per cent. (Icelandair Group Annual 
Report 2014.) 
The company flies to 39 destinations with the emphasis on connecting European 
destinations with North American destinations. In Europe, Icelandair Group operates 
flights to 25 cities. Likewise, the company flies to 14 destinations in North America. 
Iceland air is not a member of any airline alliance, and, therefore, the network is not 
further expanded with code-share operations. (Icelandair Group Annual Report 2014.) 
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Icelandair Group operates a fleet of 37 aircrafts. The company owns 28 of the 
aircrafts, whereas 9 are leased. Out of the 37 aircrafts, Iceland air operates 21 Boeing 
757 in its international network operations. Seven narrow body aircrafts are operated by 
the regional Air Iceland. The company has placed orders on 16 Boeing 737 MAX8 and 
MAX9 airliners, that are to be used for fleet expansio , not fleet replacement of the of 
older Boeing 757s. The new 737s will yield a 20% reduction in fuel consumption per 
seat in comparison to older 757s. (Icelandiar Annual Report 2014.) According aviation 
consultancy Air Insight (2014), the b757 fleet averages 18.9 years. Icelandair Group 
uses the rest of the fleet to selling capacity solutions for other carriers and tour operators 
under the brand Loftleider Icelandc. These include leasing out the aircraft and providing 
maintenance for long term as well as charter operations. In addition, the company 
provides ACMI (aircraft, crew, maintenance, and insurance) contracts in which the crew 
and insurance are also provided by the company. (Icelandiar Annual Report 2014.) 
During its fiscal year 2014, the company carried a tot l of 2.893 million passengers. 
The total revenue for the year was USD1.113 billion (~€991 536 338). The total ASK 
for the group stood at 9 820.9 million, of which 9 673.3 million ASK was for the 
international flights and 1 47.6 million ASK for the regional and Greenland operations. 
Load factor on international routes was 80.4%, whereas in regional operations it was 
71.5%. Revenue passenger kilometres for the group where 7 788 million kilometres. 
The cost per available seat kilometre was USD0.0976 (€0.087). The Icelandair Group 
employed an average of 3 109 full-time employees in the fiscal year 2014. (Icelandair 
Group Annual Report 2014.) 
5.2.5 Comparison of the Airlines 
Despite being rather homogenous airlines, there is some variation among the sample 
companies with regards to key figures discussed above. Table 2 lists the airlines’ key 




Table 2 Key Information on Nordic listed airlines 
Nordic Listed Airlines 
  Finnair SAS** Norwegian 
Icelandair 
Group 
Ownership 55.8% Government 50% Government Private Private 
No. of destinations >70 125 130 39 
Fleet size (no.) 45 138 95 37 
Average fleet age (yrs) 10.2 11.2 4.2 18.9* 
No. of passengers 9.63m 28.4m 24.0m 2.6m 
Load factor (%) 80.2% 74.9% 80.9% 80.4% (intl.) 
Turnover (€) 2.284,5bn 4.07bn 2.328bn 0.991,5bn 
RPK (km) 24 772m 34 714m 37 615m 7 888m 
ASK (km) 30 889m 40 971m 46 479m 9 821m 
CASK (€) 0.0637 0.0804 0.05 0.087 
No. of employees 4 981 12 329 4 314 3 109 
*Boeing 757 fleet 
**Scandinavian Airlines 
      
From Table 2 it can be observed that Norwegian Air Shuttle serves most destinations 
(130) while the Icelandair Group has the least destinations (39). Scandinavian Airlines 
is close to Norwegian Air Shuttle with 125 destinatons, and Finnair operates to some 
70 destinations, which is the third most among the Nordic listed airlines. With regards 
to fleet size, Scandinavian Airlines has the largest fl et (138 aircrafts) while Icelandair 
Group has the smallest fleet (39 aircrafts). Finnair has 45 planes in its fleet while 
Norwegian Air Shuttle the second most planes (95). In terms of the average fleet age, 
Norwegian Air Shuttle has significantly newer fleet than the other Nordic airlines. The 
average age of the fleet is 4.2 years. In contrast, Icelandair Group fleet is the oldest at an 
average age of 18.9 years, whereas Finnair fleet is 10.2 years old, and Scandinavian 
Airlines comes close at 11.2 years. 
In terms of passenger figures, Scandinavian Airlines is the largest of the companies. 
The airline carried a total of 28.4million passengers during the fiscal year 2014. 
Scandinavian Airlines also generated the largest turnover that was €4.07billion. In 
contrast, Icelandair Group was the smallest carrier in terms of passengers carried and 
turnover. The figures for Icelandair Group were 2.6million and €0.991,5billion 
respectively. Norwegian Air Shuttle carried the second most passengers (24million) and 
generated a turnover of €2.328billion. Finnair, however, generated the second largest 
turnover of €2.284,5billlion while carrying the third most passengers (9.63million). The 
largest company measured by the employees is Scandinavian Airlines with 12 329 
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employees. Finnair has the second largest number of employees (4981) while 
Norwegian Air Shuttle has 4 314 full-time equivalents. Icelandair Group is the smallest 
employer among the airlines with 3 109 employees. 
When analysing capacity, its utilisation, and efficiency there is also variation among 
the companies. Norwegian Air Shuttle offers the most available seat kilometres (46 
479million) and also flew the most revenue passenger kilometres (37 615million). 
Scandinavian Airlines ranks second with 40 971million available seat kilometres and 34 
714million revenue passenger kilometres. Finnair offered 30 889million available seat 
kilometres and flew 24 772million revenue passenger kilometres. Icelandair Group 
offers the smallest capacity, 9 821million available seat kilometres, and the company 
flew the least revenue passenger kilometres, 7 888million. However, Icelandair Group 
ranked second in selling the offered capacity. When assessing the achieved load factor, 
there is little variation among the three best carriers. The load factor for Icelandair 
Group was 80.4% in the international traffic. Norwegian Air shuttle had the highest load 
factor of 80.9%, while Finnair achieved a load factor of 80.2%. Scandinavian Airlines, 
on the contrary, achieved a load factor that was quite different when comparing to other 
sample airlines. The load factor for the company stood at 74.9%. In terms of operational 
efficiency Norwegian Air Shuttle is the leading carrie  among the chosen airlines. The 
airline had the lowest unit cost per available seat kilometre which was €0.05 euros. 
Finnair had the second lowest unit cost at €0.0637. Likewise, Scandinavian Airlines’ 
unit cost per available seat kilometre was €0.0804. Icelandair Group had the highest unit 
cost at €0.087. 
All in all, there is variation among the Nordic countries listed airlines with respect to 
size, load factor, and efficiency. Load factors where rather similar except for the 
Scandinavian airlines, which had a load factor of less than 80%. What is more, 
Norwegian Air Shuttle had the lowest unit cost of €0.05 per available seat kilometre and 
the highest load factor of 80.9%. This is not very surprising when considering that 
Norwegian Air Shuttle is the only low-cost carrier among the companies. 
5.3 Jet Fuel Price Exposure 
5.3.1 Data 
The quantitative data used is from Thomson Datastrem database. The data is daily data 
transformed into weekly return data. The weekly frequ ncy was chosen due to less noise 
in the data and it is of common practice with long financial time series. The data 
includes OMX Helsinki, OMX Stockholm, OMX Iceland, and Oslo bors stock indices. 
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For the jet fuel, the Platts Jet Fuel Cargoes CIF North-West Europe was chosen because 
significant part of jet fuel procurement is priced against this index. The data is for the 
period 2006 to 2014, except for Icelandair Group. The collected data for Icelandair 
Group is from December 22nd 2006. The airline was not listed at the beginning of 2006. 
Figure 6 highlights the performance of the Nordic countries’ listed airlines 
performance over the sample period. 
 
Figure 6 Total return indexes for the Nordic listed airlines (Source: Thomson 
Datastream) 
From the figure 6 one can observe that Norwegian Air Shuttle has performed far 
superior when compared to its Nordic counterparts. On the contrary, Finnair, 
Scandinavian Airlines, and Icelandair Group have performed more in tandem, although 
there is variation among the airlines. Over the sample period, Scandinavian Airlines has 
performed the poorest while Finnair has yielded better returns. However, Icelandair 
Group has performed better than Finnair and Scandinvia  Airlines from 2011 onwards. 
After the Financial Crisis, Norwegian Air Shuttle soared and its return index diverted 
from the rest of the airlines. Table 3 summarises th  descriptive statistics for the weekly 
logarithmic returns of the airlines, stock indices, and jet fuel. 
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SAS - TOT RETURN IND (~E )
FINNAIR - TOT RETURN IND (~E )
NORWEGIAN AIR SHUTTLE - TOT RETURN IND (~E )
ICELANDAIR GROUP - TOT RETURN IND (~E )
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream    
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Finnair OMX HEL Icelandair OMX Iceland Norwegian Oslo bors SAS OMX Stockholm Jet fue
 Mean -0.003204 -8.41E-05 -0.003581 -0.000636  0.002919  0.000604 -0.005794  0.000962  0.0001
 Median -0.002407  0.002013  3.24E-05  0.000000  0.000000  0.004555 -0.006233  0.004434  0.0020
 Maximum  0.173272  0.103822  0.075520  0.459532  0.248180  0.168338  0.364873  0.109859  0.1266
 Minimum -0.175302 -0.179758 -1.091263 -0.932951 -0.226304 -0.247826 -0.379214 -0.230497 -0.1755
 Std. Dev.  0.043959  0.032495  0.060047  0.094451  0.068042  0.037261  0.082929  0.030581  0.0385
 Observations 469 469 419 419 469 469 469 469 469
 
Out of the airlines, Scandinavian Airlines had the ighest standard deviation 
(0.082929). What is more, all the airlines, except for Norwegian Air Shuttle had a 
negative mean weekly logarithmic return. The median returns were negative for Finnair 
and Scandinavian Airlines. Norwegian Air Shuttle and Icelandair Group had 
approximately 0 median return. Then, Scandinavian Airlines exhibited the single 
highest weekly logarithmic return of 0.363873. The mean return for jet fuel was 
0.000179 for the period and the median 0.002086. Likewise, the standard deviation for 
jet fuel was 0.038515. 
5.3.2 Regression analysis 
To study the jet fuel price risk exposure, a multivar ate regression is used. To control for 
the stock market effects, respective local stock market index returns are included as the 
control variable.  According to Loudon (2004), including market returns is of common 
practice in evaluating exposures. It attenuates the omitted variable bias and includes the 
wider market influences, such as macroeconomic factors, on individual stock returns. 
Instead of simple returns, logarithmic returns are used. The logarithmic returns 
exhibited less kurtosis and skewness in the analysis of the data. The regression model to 
test for the jet fuel exposure is as follows: 
 




 #$,& is the weekly log return for airline i for week w, 
 )$,& is the market risk factor for airline i for week w, 
 #*+,,& is the weekly log return for the corresponding market, 
 -$,& is the jet fuel exposure factor for airline i for week w, 
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 #.,& is the weekly log return for jet fuel for week w, and 
 0$,& is the residual for airline i for week w. 
 
The model does by no means aim at exhaustively explaining airline stock returns, but 
rather providing evidence if there is any statistically significant jet fuel exposure among 
the Nordic countries’ listed airlines. As jet fuel is the largest operating expense item 
among the airlines in the study, it is reasonable to assume that changes in the price of jet 
fuel would have an impact on the companies. What is more, an increase in the price of 
jet fuel should have a negative impact on the airlines. Therefore, the hypothesis tests if 
the jet fuel exposure of the airlines is different from zero and negative. 
 
5.3.3 Results 
After estimating the model and running the regressions, the independent variables 
where tested for multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors where all less than 1.5, 
implicating that multicollinearity is not present to a significant degree. However, the 
data for the Iceland OMX stock exchange exhibited signs of structural change. Figure 7 
graphs the OMX Iceland stock market index. 
 
Figure 7 OMX Icealand Stock Market Index (data: Thoms n Datastream) 
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From the figure one can observe the collapse of the s ock market index during the 
Financial crisis. In the aftermath, the stock market levelled off. Therefore, the sample 
period for the Icelandair Group begins from the last week of the year 2008 yielding 314 




Table 4 Jet fuel exposures 
Finnair 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Fuel Exposure 0.016205 0.052043 0.311371 0.7557 
OMX Helsinki 0.511174 0.061685 8.286884 0.0000*** 





0.040694 Obs 469 
Scandinavian Airlines 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Fuel Exposure -0.047626 0.091404 -0.521046 0.6026 
OMX Stockholm 1.323473 0.115121 11.49633 0.0000*** 





0.072815 Obs 469 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Fuel Exposure -0.361564 0.085630 -4.222379 0.0000*** 
Oslo Bors 0.978136 0.088514 11.05063 0.0000*** 





0.060506 Obs 469 
Icelandair Group 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Fuel Exposure -0.333226 0.111949 -2.976593 0.0031*** 
OMX Iceland 0.264468 0.178416 1.482310 0.1393 





0.068612 Obs 314 




The results for the Nordic listed airlines are somewhat ambiguous. The jet fuel 
exposure factor for Finnair was 0.016205. What is more, the term is positive, but it is 
not statistically significantly different from zero. The weekly stock market return had a 
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positive coefficient of 0.511 and was significant even at the 0.01 confidence level. 
Likewise, the adjusted R squared was 0.143032. It is quite ambiguous to find the 
exposure term to be positive tough not statistically significant. For Scandinavian 
Airlines, the jet fuel exposure was -0.0476 and the stock market coefficient 1.323. The 
jet fuel exposure term was negative but not statistically significant. The stock market 
term was significant even at the 0.01 confidence level. The adjusted R squared for 
Scandinavian Airlines was 0.229. In the case of Norwegian Air Shuttle, the results 
exhibited negative fuel exposure. The jet fuel exposure term for the company was -
0.361564, and it was statistically significant even at the 0.01 confidence level. Likewise, 
the stock market variable was 0.9781 and significant at the 0.01 confidence level. The 
model had an R squared of 0.209220 in the case of Norwegian Air Shuttle. The 
Icelandair Group also exhibit negative jet fuel exposure, however with less observations 
(314) than the rest of the airlines (469). The jet fuel exposure term was -0.333 and it 
was statistically significant at the 0.01 confidenc level. Likewise, the stock market 
term was 0.2644 and significant at 0.01. The adjusted R squared of the model for 
Icelandair Group was 0.0247, which is much lower than for the rest of the airlines. 
The results are ambiguous with regards to previous literature regarding the price 
exposure. The results are not in line with Carter, Roger, Simkins, and Treanor (2014). 
They found the jet fuel exposure to be statistically significant for the U.S. listed airlines. 
In the thesis only two of the airlines exhibited a negative jet fuel exposure. However, 
the results are partly in line with Berghöfer and Lucey (2014) where they found the jet 
fuel exposures to be higher for the U.S. listed airlines than for the European listed 
airlines. However, they found the exposures to be statistically significant for the 
European carries as well, which is not entirely in line with the thesis’ results. One 
possible explanation is that the U.S. stock market and the U.S. listed airlines are more 
traded than the Nordic stock exchanges and the Nordic listed airlines. Likewise, the 
European airlines in the Berghöfer and Lucey (2014) included large and more heavily 
traded airlines such as Lufthansa, IAG (Iberia, British Airways, and Vueling), and 
Airfrance-KLM. The airlines in the thesis, in turn, are small carriers in the European 
periphery listed in less traded Stock exchanges. On the contrary, the results of the thesis 
are more inline with Loudon (2004) where the results also exhibited ambiguity. He 
found the jet fuel exposure to be negative and statistically significant for Australian 
Qantas Airways, whereas the exposure for Air New Zealand was positive and 
statistically significant for longer time period. Likewise, the evidence from the thesis is 
in line with Bartram (2003) in which he found not all the companies have a significant 
commodity price exposure. Bartram also concluded that some companies are somewhat 
successful in hedging the commodity price exposures. One plausible reason for the 
thesis’ results might be that Scandinavian Airlines and Finnair have more successful jet 




5.4 Hedging Practices 
In this section, the emphasis is on how the Nordic countries’ listed airlines hedge 
against jet fuel price risk. Furthermore, each of the sample airlines’ hedging practices 
between the years 2006 and 2014 are individually analysed. In addition, there is 
comparison of the individual airlines’ hedging practises. 
5.4.1 Finnair 
Finnair manages its jet fuel price risk and other financial risks in accordance with its 
risk management policy. According to Finnair’s Annual Report (2015), the risk 
management policy is approved by the Board of Directors, and the policy dictates the 
minimum and maximum levels allowed for each specific f nancial risk. In addition, the 
financial risk management is both directed and supervis d by the Financial Risk 
Steering Group. However, the implementation of the risk management policy is 
conducted by the finance department of the company. (Finnair Annual Report 2014, 
2015.) 
The airline states that the future development of jet fuel price is one of the most 
significant near-term risks and uncertainties the company faces. What is more, the fuel 
price development has a significant impact on the company’s result because fuel costs 
are the most significant expense item. According to Finnair (2015), a ten percent change 
in the world jet fuel prices would have an impact of approximately 16million euros on 
the operating result taking the hedging into account. Without the jet fuel hedges in 
place, the effect would be 43million euros at an anual level. (Finnair Annual Report 
2014, 2015.) 
The hedging is conducted with the principle of time diversification since it is done on 
a rolling basis.  Figure 8 illustrates the jet fuel h dging policy at Finnair. 
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Figure 8 Jet fuel hedging profile (source: Finnair Q4 Interim Report 2014) 
The risk management policy sets the minimum and maxi um limits for the hedging 
for each coming quarter as can be seen from the figure 8. The company currently hedges 
24 months forward with the upper and lower hedging limits being 90% and 60%, 
respectively. Then, the hedging limits decrease approximately 10% per quarter for the 
next 18 months. The hedges must fall between the predefined hedging limits at the end 
of each quarter. This layered hedging profile is replicated on a rolling basis. 
Consequently, at the end of the following quarter, he hedging levels are increased so 
that the hedging is in accordance with the hedging policy. Again, this is done at the end 
of the following quarter, so the layered hedging profile remains constant over time. The 
hedging provides time diversification since the hedges are bought incrementally as the 
time passes. As a result, the fuel prices are not locked in at one point in time but over 
longer time horizon at different price levels. According to Pasi Keski-Karhu (interview 
11.5.2015), the Director of Treasury Operations, responsible for jet fuel risk 
management and hedging, at Finnair, the risk management policy would allow deviating 
from the hedging limits in between the quarters as long as the hedging ratios would be 
in accordance with the risk management policy at the end of each quarter. However, he 
states that he has not deviated from the policy guidelines because the essence of hedging 
is not to speculate but to consistently and prudently hedge over time. 
Since the commodity prices are highly volatile and jet fuel such a significant expense 
item, the company engages in jet fuel hedging. Mr. Keski-Karhu states that by hedging, 
the company aims at providing a platform for busines planning over medium and 
longer term. For example, investment in new fleet can be done even years in advance 
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and the planes will operate in service even up to 10 to 15 years. Consequently, the 
capital budgeting would be extremely difficult if the company remained fully exposed 
to jet fuel price changes. Therefore, the hedging aims at consistency, stability, and 
continuance. By hedging the airline seeks predictability in how fuel price changes 
would impact the company. (Pasi Keski-Karhu) 
 
If we didn’t hedge and remained fully exposed to fuel price 
fluctuations, the planning of business operations would be very difficult. 
It would be much like tossing a coin. 
(Pasi Keski-Karhu, Director of Tresury Operations at Finnair) 
 
Only options and swap contracts are currently employed in the jet fuel hedging at 
Finniar. However, Paski Keski-Karhu points out that the risk management policy would 
allow employing other derivatives instruments as well. In the extreme price increases of 
petroleum products options are preferred over swaps. For example, during the outbreak 
of the Libyan crisis in 2011 the price of oil soared and Finnair preferred options over 
swap contracts. Swaps, however, are much employed during low price regimes notes 
Mr. Keski-Karhu. Options are used to built option structures. The risk management 
policy dictates what option structures can be used. In addition, it requires that the option 
structures are all zero in cost. Therefore, simple call options are not feasible. According 
to Mr. Keski-Karhu the option premiums would be extr mely expensive due to high 
volatility of commodity prices. Therefore, most of the airlines use zero-cost structures 
except for some large airlines such as Germany’s Deutsche Lufthansa which has also 
used simple cap options in its jet fuel hedging. Finna r uses both collar and three-way 
collar12 structures in jet fuel hedging. 
All the derivatives instruments Finnair employs in jet fuel hedging are over-the-
counter. Pasi Keski-Karhu highlights that listed derivatives would be very expensive 
due to actual daily settlement of the cash flows resulting from the hedges. It would pose 
a significant risk should the hedges fall deep out f he money13 because the airline 
should settle the losses daily. What is more, there is lack of availability in listed jet fuel 
products. Over-the-counter contracts can be tailored to meet airlines’ hedging needs and 
they are settled only at maturity. The daily value of the contracts is calculated and they 
only affect the credit line obtained from the counterparty. Therefore, if the hedges are 
                                                 
12 Three-way collar is similar to a regular collar but in the case of airlines, in addition to selling a put 
option and buying a call option, airline sells an additional call option with a strike price higher than the 
strike of the acquired cap. Consequently, the acquired cap protects the airline from price increases until
the strike proce of the written call option. From there on, the net effect of the call options equals the spot 
market price. 
13 Hedge is out of the money for an airline when the strike price is higher than the underlying’s sport 
price. 
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deep out of the money, actual settlements are not conducted. Instead, they only affect 
the credit line. In other words, the credit line limits how much of exposure the 
counterparty will tolerate from the airline. The only underlying instrument currently 
used in hedging is jet fuel, although the mandate allows hedging with other distillates as 
well. According to Pasi Keski-Karhu, jet fuel is widely used as the underlying partly 
because it is rather simple without the basis risk and partly because there is poor data 
available on the crack spread. For example, Bloomberg t rminal updates the crack 
spread only once a day. He also notes that jet fuel is widely used as the underlying 
among the carriers as well.  
Finnair has also invested in modern fleet and engages in operational hedging 
measures in addition to financial hedging. According to the Annual Report 2014, 
investment in next generation aircrafts aims at lowering the fuel consumption. The 
Airbus A350s on order will reduce the fuel consumption by 25% when compared to 
Airbus A340s in service. In addition, Finnair introduced an economical flying training 
program in 2012 aimed at all its pilots. The program implements operating practices to 
increase overall fuel economy of flights. The measure  include flying at optimal 
airspeed, altitude, and the most direct route availble, as well as operating continuous 
descent approaches whenever possible. In continuous descent approach the flight 
continuously descents with less throttle or idle throttle resulting in less fuel burned 
when compared to conventional approach in which descending takes takes place with 
discreet descents to several flight levels. What is more, the planes taxi using only one 
engine whenever possible, which also reduces fuel consumption. Likewise, Finnair has 
reduced the empty weight of the aircraft by investing n the fleet modernisation. For 
example, the company has used light weight materials in its cabin and seats. Finnair 
also replaced all luggage containers in its narrow-b dy fleet with composite material 
containers that are lighter in weight than the conventional containers. (Finnair Annual 
Report 2014, 2015.) Mr. Keski-Karhu notes that while finding marginal ways to 
improve efficiency and reduce the empty weight of the planes may sound trivial, the 
fact that the airline operates numerous flights a ye r cause marginal improvements to 
add up to significant figures on an annual level. For example, Finnair weighed the seat 
back magazines and estimated that the removal of the magazines would yield savings of 
several million euros a year due to lower fuel consumption. The analysis, however, was 
conducted few years ago during a higher fuel price egime, but provides a concrete 
example of the significance of even marginal improvements. 
Finnair currently does not systematically employ alternative fuels in its flight 
operations. In 2014, the airline operated a flight from Helsinki to New York with 
biofuel mixture partly manufactured from cooking oil. However, according to Finnair 
(2015) the broader use of biofuels is not really feasible due to lack of availability. What 
is more, the price of alternative biofuels is three times the price of conventional fossil jet 
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fuel. (Finnair Annual Report 2014, 2015.) Pasi Keski-Karhu views that bio fuels will 
not be a relevant alternative in the near future. H states that the current bio fuel flights 
among airlines have been more about gaining positive publicity. However, the 
emergence of unconventional fuel sources, such as sale oil, is in Keski-Karhu’s view a 
very positive development. He views that additional supply not coming from the Middle 
East and OPEC should lessen the impact of these very producers’ actions in the 
commodity markets. Still, Mr. Keski-Karhu views tha, over a very long time horizon, 
alternative fuels will likely replace fossil fuels to a large extent at least in the industries 
where possible. 
The hedging practices of Finnair have evolved over time to some degree. However, 
the jet fuel hedging appears to be very consistent over the studied time period. Table 5 
highlights the jet fuel hedging practices of Finnair over the time period of 2006–2014. 
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Table 5 Hedging of jet fuel price risk at Finnair 2006–2014 (source: Company Annual 





Finnair’s hedging ratio between the years 2006–2014 has not varied substantially, as 
can be observed from the table 5. At the end of the iscal year the company reports the 
hedging ratios for the next six months and for the second half separately. Finnair had 
hedged 63% of its anticipated fuel consumption for the coming six months at the end of 
the financial year 2006 and 42% for the rest of the year. The single largest change in the 
hedging ratio for the coming six months took place between the years 2006 and 2007. 
At end of the financial year 2007 the hedging ratio between was 70% for the first half of 
2008 (an increase of 7 percentage points). The hedging ratio for the second half of the 
coming financial year increased the most from 2007 to 2008, by a total of 11 percentage 
points. At the end of 2008 this ratio was 54%, whereas in 2007 it was 43%. From 2008 
onwards, the hedging ratios remained somewhat similar and exhibited relatively little 
variation. The time horizon of jet fuel hedging was three years in 2006 and 2007. Then, 
the time horizon was 30 months, and from 2010 onwards it has remained at 24 months. 
In terms of derivatives instruments used in hedging a d the underlying commodity, 
the airline has exhibited consistency. During the years 2006 and 2010, Finnair hedged 
jet fuel price risk with forward contracts, swaps, and options. From the year 2011 
onwards, the company have foregone forwards and only employs swaps and options. As 
the underlying instrument, Finnair has used jet fuel, gas oil, and jet differential between 
the years 2006 and 2008. Because the company engaged in cross hedging by hedging 
with gasoil, the basis was managed with jet differential contracts. During 2009 and 
2010, the underlying instruments were jet fuel and jet differential, latter of which was 
likely a remainder from the previous years’ gasoil cross hedging. From 2011 onwards, 
only jet fuel has been used as the underlying asset in j  fuel hedging. 
The fuel expenses share of total operating expenses and its volume relative to 
company turnover has mostly been on an increase over the observed period, except for 
the slight decrease after the year 2008. Fuel spending represented 19% of the total 
operating costs in 2006, and in the year 2014 it was already 28% of the total operating 
expenses. The most significant year-on-year increase in relative fuel costs took place 
between 2007 and 2008. In the year 2007, fuel expenses where 20.1% of total operating 
expenses whereas in 2008 they where 24.2%, an increase of 4.1 percentage points. 
Following the 2008, the figure tumbled to 21.4% in 2009 and further to 21.2% in 2010 
before returning to growth path. Fuel costs as a percentage of turnover have developed 
similarly with a growing trend except for the drop in 2010. It is interesting to notice that 
the decrease took place in 2010, whereas the fuel cost relative to total operating 
expenses already fell in 2009. In 2006 the fuel costs where 19.4% of turnover, and in 
2014 they stood at 28.7%. 
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The hedging limits with regards to jet fuel consumption have remained quite 
constant. For the period 2006–2009, Finnair’s hedging policy required hedging more 
than 60% of consumption for the next six months. Thereafter, the hedging ratio fell until 
being zero three years in advance. Then, the hedging policy changed in 2010 and have 
remained unchanged for the rest of the observation period. In the new policy an upper 
limit was introduced, and the level by which the hedging ratio would decrease on a 
quarterly basis was also introduced. In this very policy, the hedging ratio for the coming 
six months is 60–90%, and from thereon the hedging ratio falls 10% each quarter up 
until being zero after 24 months. All in all, the hdging levels and practices are quite 
constant at Finnair, and the hedging has been systematic over the time period. 
5.4.2 Scandinavian Airlines 
Scandinavian Airlines states that it manages financial risks, including jet fuel price risk, 
through hedging. By engaging in hedging, the company aims at countering short term 
fluctuations in market prices as well as providing scope to manage any changes. What is 
more, the hedging strategy of the company aims at en bling the company to act 
promptly when changes in jet fuel market prices are advantageous. All risk management 
is conducted centrally in accordance with the financi l policy adopted by the Board. 
(Scandinavian Airlines Annual Report 2013–2014, 2015.) 
The airline highlights that jet fuel costs are its largest operating expense item. The 
company estimates that a one percent change in the pric  of jet fuel would have an 
impact of approximately SEK88million (~9.28million euros) on the result of its airline 
operations. If the change is positive, the effect would be negative, and vice versa. 
(Scandinavian Airlines Annual Report 2013–2104, 2015.) In the jet fuel price hedging, 
Scandinavian Airlines currently employs a mixture of call options and swap 
agreements. In fact, the company lowered its hedging level for the Q1 2015 from 100% 
down to 79% due to out-of-the-money call options. (Scandinavian Airlines Interim 
Report Q4 2013–2014, 2014.) 
The jet fuel hedging policy for Scandinavian Airlines is currently rather 
straightforward. The company hedges 40–80% of its forecasted consumption 12 months 
in advance. However, it appears that the company employs some time diversification in 
its hedging. According to the Annual Report 2013–2014 (2015), the company was 79% 
hedged for the next quarter and 72% for the following quarter. Then, the hedging fell to 
26% and only 6% for the following quarters. While there appears to be time 
diversification, the risk management policy does not require that. Instead, only the 40–
80% limits apply for the coming 12 months. (Scandinav an Airlines Annual Report 
2013–2014, 2015.) 
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Scandinavian Airlines has also taken operational measures to lower the fuel 
consumption in order to mitigate the jet fuel price risk. The company has equipped its 
existing fleet with lighter seats, so as to reduce th  fuel consumption. Likewise, the 
company has refitted its planes with new, less fuel consuming engines. In addition, fuel 
consumption has decreased due to investment in new,more fuel efficient fleet. For 
example, in its fiscal year 2013–2014, the company phased out its old McDonnel 
Douglas MD80s and replaced them with Airbus A320s which have better fuel 
efficiency. In addition, Scandinavian Airlines has placed orders on eight next generation 
Airbus A350 wide body aircrafts, the first of which will begin service in late 2015. The 
airline also continuously seeks ways to reduce fuel consumption on daily flight 
operations. The measures include more efficient operation of the aircraft in air and on 
the ground. In addition, the company states it seek measures to reduce the weight of the 
aircrafts. (Scandinavian Airlines Annual Report 2013–2014, 2015.) However, detailed 
information is not given about the operational measure  used in the air nor on the 
ground to reduce the fuel consumption. 
Scandinavian Airlines does not employ alternative jet fuel on a large scale. The 
company flew a few flights in 2014 with using a mixture of synthetic jet fuel JET A1. In 
addition, a decision was made to purchase the altern tive jet fuel for flights operated 
from Oslo in 2015, however, only with a small quantity mixed in with the conventional 
jet fuel. Scandinavian Airlines also continues its efforts to accelerate the large-scale 
commercialisation of alternative fuels via the Nordic Initiative established in 2013. The 
initiative aims at making bio fuels a reality in larger scale in the near term, and the 
airline was one of the founding members of the initiative. (Scandinavian Airlines 
Annual Report 2014.) 
Jet fuel hedging at the Scandinavian airlines appears to be quite constant over the 
long time horizon. Table 6 highlights the hedging practices of Scandinavian airlines 
between the years 2006–2014.  
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Table 6 Hedging of jet fuel price risk at Scandinavian Airlines 2006–2014 (source: 




From the table 6 we can observe that Scandinavian Airlines has hedged its 
anticipated fuel consumption with quite some variation among the hedging ratios. The 
figure before the slash is the hedging level for the next six months and after the slash for 
the second half of the coming fiscal year (except for 2006, where only the annual ratio 
was available). At the end of the year 2006, the airline had hedged 57% of its 
anticipated fuel consumption for the coming year. The next year, significantly less of 
the anticipated fuel consumption was hedged for the following six months as well as the 
second half of the year. The hedging ratios at the end of the fiscal year 2007 where 41% 
and 40% respectively, which is approximately 16 percentage points less than in the 
previous year. During the 2008 and 2009, the hedging ratios for the coming year stood 
at around 60% for the first half of the following year before falling down to around 55% 
for 2010 and 2011. Then, the single largest increase (27 percentage points) in the 
hedging ratio took place in 2013, when as much as 90% of the fuel consumption for the 
first half of the year was hedged. However, only 14% of the second half’s anticipated 
fuel consumption was hedged at the end of 2013. The hedging horizon has been very 
constant during the observed period. From the year 2006 to 2009, the hedging horizon 
was 12 months for Scandinavian Airlines. Then, from 2010 to 2013, the time horizon 
was extended to 18 months. Again from 2014 onwards it has been reduced back to 12 
months. 
Scandinavian Airlines has been very consistent with the derivatives instruments 
employed in the hedging. From the table 6, one can observe that the airline has 
employed only options and swaps throughout the sample period. The options also 
include collar structures over the sample period. Although, the company does not 
systematically state the underlying commodity used in fuel price risk management, it 
can be found in the annual reports and interim reports that the underlying asset is jet 
fuel. This is because at the end of financial year, the company states the fixed prices and 
the respective proportions of jet fuel in its hedging portfolio for the next fiscal year. 
Therefore, if the underlying asset would have been other than jet fuel the basis risk 
related to cross hedging would make it unfeasible to stimate the price paid for jet fuel 
in advance.  
Scandinavian Airlines has some degree of variation in the fuel expenses relative 
share of total operating expenses as well as in fuel expenses relative to turnover during 
the period 2006–2014. In 2006 the fuel expense share of total operating expenses was 
18%. During the period 2007–2010 the share remained between 16–18%, whereas in 
2010 the figure reached 20.2% and peaked in 2013 at 24.5% while decreasing to 23.3% 
in 2014. It can be observed that the fuel costs’ share of operating expenses have 
increased. When comparing to turnover, it can be observed from the table that the there 
is a similar trend. In 2006 the fuel costs relative to turnover where 17.8%, whereas in 
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2014 the figure was 23.2%. During the period, the figure was at its lowest at 15.5% in 
2007. 
The hedging limits concerning the fuel price hedging have been quite constant. 
During the period 2006 to 2009, the hedging limits where 40 at the bottom and 60% at 
the top. In 2010, Scandinavian Airlines increased the upper hedging limit to 70%, and 
again in 2011 to 80%. Between the years 2011 and 2014, the hedging limits have 
remained constant, the lower limit being 40% and the upper limit 80%. The limits are 
on a rolling basis for the coming 12 months. 
5.4.3 Norwegian Air Shuttle 
At Norwegian Air Shuttle, financial risk management and hedging are based on the 
group’s risk management policy. Financial risk management is implemented and 
conducted by the central treasury department in accordance with the risk management 
policy. Group’s operating units together with the group treasury identifies, evaluates, 
and hedges against the risks. (Norwegian Annual Report 2014, 2015.) 
According to Norwegian Air Shuttle (2015), jet fuel costs are a substantial expense 
item among its operating expenses, and, therefore, the price fluctuation of jet fuel 
impacts its anticipated cash flows. By implementing the jet fuel hedging strategy, the 
company seeks protection from both sudden and significa t jet fuel price increases. 
Meanwhile, the company states that it wants to retain access to price reductions as well. 
(Norwegian Annual Report 2014, 2015.) In its Q4 2014 interim report, the airline 
estimated that a one percent decrease in jet fuel spot market price, would result in 
NOK44million (~EUR4.86million) increase in income on an annual level, without the 
jet fuel hedging taken into consideration. (2014 Q4 Interim Report Norwegian, 2015.) 
The group manages jet fuel price exposure with derivatives instruments. The only 
derivatives instrument used in the jet fuel hedging is fuel forward contracts. Unlike the 
other listed airlines in the Nordic countries, the company does not employ options nor 
swap contracts. What is more, the group treasury has a mandate to hedge up to 12 
months in advance. Similar to derivatives instruments, the risk management policy sets 
the limits with regards to hedging ratios. The policy allows currently hedging up to 
100% of the anticipated jet fuel consumption for the next 12 months. However, there is 
no minimum required hedging level dictated by the risk management policy. 
(Norwegian Annual Report 2014, 2015.) Therefore, the policy allows the airline to 
remain fully exposed to jet fuel spot market price fluctuations and is not very prudent. 
With regards to operational measures in reducing the jet fuel consumption and, 
therefore, the price exposure, the airline has engaged in operational hedging as well. 
Norwegian Air Shuttle operates the youngest fleet of the Nordic countries’ listed 
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airlines (4.2 years), and the company has heavily invested in new, fuel efficient fleet. 
For example, in 2012, the airline placed an order of 222 short-haul aircrafts. In addition, 
the company operates and has placed additional orders on the Boeing 787 wide-body 
aircraft. The airline estimated that the realized fuel saving per seat with Boeing 787s has 
been more than 20% when compared to other similarly sized aircrafts that are not built 
from the composite materials. According to the company (2015), via investment in 
modern fleet, the airline has managed to decrease fuel consumption by 20% since the 
year 2008. (Norwegian Annual Report 2014, 2015) 
In addition to investment in new fleet, Norwegian Air Shuttle has taken other 
operational measures as well. In 2014, the airline flew its first flight using biofuel. 
However, the use of biofuels is not systematic nor has the company stated anything 
about employing them in larger scale in the near future. What is more, the airline 
operates continuous descent approaches whenever possible. In addition, the company 
has fitted all its Boeing 737-800 series narrow-body aircrafts with winglets, that reduce 
the drag and, thus, fuel consumption. The winglets are fins located at the end of the 
wingtips. Likewise, the airline aims to minimize the empty weight of the aircraft, which 
likely stems from the low-cost business model. Lastly, the company conducts a special 
engine wash on each aircraft two to three times a year, to reduce the fuel consumption. 
(Norwegian Annual Report 2014.) 
Norwegian Air Shuttle appears to have quite some variation in its hedging practices 
over the observed period. Table 7 exhibits the jet fu l hedging between the years 2006 
and 2014 at Norwegian Air Shuttle. 
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Table 7 Hedging of jet fuel price risk at Norwegian Air Shuttle 2006–2014 (source: 





Norwegian Air Shuttle has been quite inconsistent i hedging its jet fuel 
consumption between the years 2006 and 2014. The hedging levels for the coming year 
have shown variation as can be seen from table 7. At the end of the fiscal year 2006, the 
airline was 50% hedged for the first half and 25% hedged for the second half of the 
coming year. Then, the company seem to have remained fully exposed to jet fuel price 
fluctuations because it had hedged 0% of the jet ful consumption for the coming year. 
Likewise, Norwegian Air Shuttle had hedged only 7.3%, a 7.3 percentage point increase 
from the previous year, at the end of the fiscal 2008 before reaching 25% hedging ratio 
at the end of the fiscal 2009. However, the company decreased the hedging for the year 
2011 as it was 16% hedged at the end of 2010 and for the coming years remained 
basically unhedged. Only in 2014, the airline started hedging again and was 27% 
hedged at the end of the year. The single largest dcrease in the hedging ratio for 
Norwegian Air Shuttle is 25 percentage points, and the single largest increase is 27 
percentage points. 
Norwegian Air Shuttle, however, has kept its maximum hedging horizon and 
derivatives instruments constant over the observation period. Form the table 7, it can be 
seen that the airline has had a maximum hedging horizon of one year throughout the 
observation period, although the company have at times remained fully exposed to jet 
fuel price fluctuations. Likewise, consistency can be seen in the hedging instruments. 
Norwegian Air Shuttle only employs forward contracts in its jet fuel hedging, and the 
underlying is jet fuel. Consequently, the company foregoes the flexibility of the options, 
but is not exposed to basis risk related to cross hedging. 
The fuel costs’ share of total operating expenses and fuel costs’ relative to the 
turnover show some variation. From the table 7 it can be seen that the fuel costs have 
represented 21.1%–32.2% of the total operating expenses. The fuel costs share have 
remained at 32% from 2011 onwards. The fuel costs relative to turnover, except for the 
years 2007, 2009, and 2012, have increased from the previous year, and they exhibit a 
growing trend. From 2011 onwards, the figure has remained approximately around 
30%, whereas in 2006, it was 23.9% of the turnover. 
An interesting point with Norwegian Air Shuttle is the hedging limits. The company 
is allowed to hedge up to 100% of its fuel consumption for the coming year, although 
the company never hedged more than 50% of the anticipated consumption. What is 
more, Norwegian has no required minimum level in its hedging ratio. Therefore, the 
hedging policy allows it to remain fully exposed to fuel price fluctuations. 
Consequently, the company remained unhedged or less than 10% hedged on five years 
out of nine during the observation period. 
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5.4.4 Icelandair Group 
Risk management is conducted in line with risk management policy guidelines set by 
the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors defin s the risk management policy 
measures so as to reduce the exposure to financial risks. The measures set by the policy, 
in turn, dictate the framework and parameters that must be considered in financial risk 
management aimed at mitigating the exposure from price volatility. The implementation 
of risk management policy is conducted by an internal isk management committee, that 
is chaired by the chief executive officer. In addition, the risk management policy is 
reviewed on a regular basis. (Annual Report 2014 Icelandair Group, 2015.) 
Icelandair Group states that jet fuel is a significant component of the company’s cost 
structure. For example, the company commented that the recent drop in jet fuel price 
can have a significant impact on its operation’s profitability over the longer term. In 
fact, the decrease in jet fuel price is the most significant item responsible for the 
increased EBITDA during the fiscal year 2014. The objective of risk management at the 
airline is to manage and control price exposures in order to maintain them at an 
acceptable level. (Annual Report Icelandair Group 2014, 2015.) 
With regards to financial risk management, the airline employs a mixture of swaps 
and options in jet fuel hedging. The policy does not allow employment of any other 
financial derivatives instruments. At current, the company hedges between 40–60% of 
the anticipated jet fuel consumption. However, should the forward ticket sales exceed 
the 40% minimum level of anticipated consumption, forward ticket sales then set the 
minimum hedging level. The time horizon for hedging is currently 9–12 months 
forward. Icelandair Group also sates that basis risk is avoided. (Annual Report 2014 
Icelandair Group, 2015.) Therefore, it can be the assumed that the airline only employs 
jet fuel as the the underlying asset in its jet fuel hedging. However, the airline did not 
explicitly mention the underlying in its financial statements. 
Icelandair Group also utilises other measures in mitigat ng jet fuel price fluctuations 
in addition to traditional derivatives instruments. The company utilises contractual risk 
transfer where feasible. What is more, the company states that ticket pricing is an 
important tool over the medium term to mitigate thejet fuel price volatility. Likewise, 
production management may become a relevant option over the longer term in coping 
with fuel price trends according to Icelandair Group. However, Icelandair Group has not 
utilised alternative sources of fuel and does not pr vide any evidence of aiming at the 
utilisation of biofuels. Nonetheless, the airline has a Fuel Management Committee that 
actively monitors and evaluates new ideas to reduce f el consumption. The operational 
measures in place include fitting most of the aircrft with winglets. What is more, the 
company placed orders on 16 narrow body Boeing 737 MAX and 737 MAX9 planes in 
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2013. The first of which will be delivered in 2018. (Annual Report 2014 Icelandair 
Group, 2015.) 
In terms of jet fuel hedging, Icelandair Group is the only airline in the study that has 
actually diverted from its hedging policy during the observation period. Table 8 exhibits 
the jet fuel hedging practices at Icelandair Group between the years 2006 and 2014. In 
fact, the the risk management policy was revised in 2014 and the extension of the 
hedging tenor of up to 12 months forward was introduced. 
 
79 
Table 8 Hedging of jet fuel price risk at Icelandair Group 2006–2014 (source: Company 
Annual Reports, Financial Statements, and Interim Reports) 
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Icelandair Group reports less information concerning the fuel hedging practices and 
also exhibits quite some variation in the hedging leve s. The company did not report the 
hedging level at the end of the fiscal year 2006. However, the company revealed in its 
2006 annual report that during the fiscal year the company’s hedging level was closer to 
lower bound of the hedging limit, which stood at 40% of the jet fuel consumption. From 
2007 the company has mostly reported its year-end hdging portfolio except for the year 
2010. In 2007, the company had hedged 55-60% of its anticipated jet fuel consumption 
for the coming year. Likewise, the figure for the coming six months at the end of 2008 
was 41.5% and for the second half of the coming year it was 16.5%. The company 
reported that it had sold put options in order to lower exposure of fixed-price swaps and 
collar structures, and the company also made an exception to the lower hedging ratio of 
40%. At the end of 2009, there were no fuel hedges in place. Therefore, the company 
remained fully exposed to market price fluctuations. The hedging level at the end of 
year 2010 was not reported, and the company stated that they are still diverting from the 
lower hedging limit of 40% and instead the company hedged at least the forward ticket 
sales volume for the coming year. The company did not reveal hedging levels at the end 
of 2010, but in 2011 the airline was 33% hedged for the first half of the year, and 10.3% 
for the second half.  The hedging levels remained somewhat similar before increasing in 
2013 and 2014, when the company had hedged 54.2% of the anticipated fuel 
consumption for the first half of the coming fiscal year, and 38.5% for the second half. 
The airline has a little variation in the hedging time horizon and the trend has been 
towards shorter time horizons, but the derivatives instruments seem to have remained 
very constant over the period. In 2006, the time horizon for jet fuel hedging was 1.5 
years. However, the following year, the time horizon was reduced to 1 year which 
remained the policy until 2010, when the hedging period was cut down to nine months. 
The hedging horizon was kept at nine months in advance, until in 2014 it was extended 
back to 12 months. The company has reported to employ options and swaps in its jet 
fuel hedging throughout the observation period. Interestingly, Icelandair Group reported 
that it had sold put options in order to offset theexposure of its swap contracts and 
collar structures during the financial year 2008. None of the other airlines reported any 
such counteraction in the hedges that had already been in place. 
Fuel costs’ share of the total operating expenditures have exhibited some fluctuation. 
In the year 2006, the fuel expenses represented 19% of the total operating expense. The 
following year, the figure was down to 16.8% (the lowest over the time period) before 
leaping to 24%. From the table 8 one can observe that the fuel costs share fell down to 
18.4%, and remained there, before hitting 25.4%. The figure has roughly remained there 
before, and in 2014 the figure was 28.4% which is the highest during the observation 
period. Comparing the fuel expenditures to the company turnover yields similar results. 
The fuel bill as a percentage of the company turnover was 16.9% in 2006, and in 2014 
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the respective figure was 24.4%. In addition, the fuel expenses relative to turnover have 
been higher during the later years of the observation period when compared to first 
years of the observation period, excluding the year 2008 when the figure soared to 23%. 
5.4.5 Results on Jet Fuel Hedging Practices 
Among the carries, there is some similarities in jet fuel hedging practices. However, 
substantial differences can be found as well over th  observation period. 
In terms of how the Nordic countries’ listed airlines perceive jet fuel expenditures, is 
very homogenous. All the airlines considered jet fuel price as a significant factor 
affecting the operations and earnings as well. What is more, all the airlines stated that 
the jet fuel is either the most significant operating expense or at least a very significant 
expense item. Figure 9 exhibits the share of jet ful of the total operating expenses for 
all the carriers during the period 2006–2014. 
 
Figure 9 Fuel costs of total operating expenses (data: company financial statements) 
From the figure 9 one can observe that among the operating expenses, the share of 
fuel costs has increased overall during the observation period. However, the figure fell 
quite a bit in the aftermath of the financial crisis when the oil and fuel prices collapsed. 
Since then, the figure has mostly been on the rise. Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) has the 
lowest fuel costs relative to operating expenses. In contrast, Norwegian Air Shuttle has 
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is the only low-cost carrier and low-cost carriers typically have slimmer overall cost 
structures when compared to traditional network carries. 
All the Nordic listed airlines have a similar approach to jet fuel price risk 
management. At the airlines, there appears to be eith r a risk management policy in 
place or financial policy includes the risk management policy as well. Furthermore, The 
Board of Directors typically sets the risk management policy that dictates the guidelines 
for the jet fuel price risk management. The actual risk management is conducted in 
group treasury function except for the Icelandair Group where there is an internal risk 
management committee that executes the hedging. At Finnair, it is solely the director of 
treasury operations that conducts the hedging in accordance with the risk management 
policy. 
In terms of derivatives instruments used in the jet fu l hedging, there appears to be 
some variation among the airlines, but the instruments used in individual airlines 
remained very consistent over the observation period. 75% of the of the companies 
employed a mixture of derivatives instruments in jet fuel hedging over the observation 
period. Only Norwegian Air Shuttle solely used simple forward contracts throughout 
the period 2006–2014. Between 2006 and 2011, Norwegian Air Shuttle and Finnair 
used forward contracts in jet fuel hedging. However, from 2011 onwards only 
Norwegian Air Shuttle employed forwards in jet fuel hedging as Finnair no longer 
employed jet fuel forwards. What is more, 75% of the airlines employed swap contracts 
in the jet fuel price risk management. The figure remained constant the whole period. In 
addition, three of the airlines also used options in jet fuel hedging throughout the years 
2006–2014. From 2011 onwards 75% of the Nordic listed airlines have hedged using a 
mixture of options and swaps. What is more, the airlines typically employ option 
structures in jet fuel hedging so as to create costless structures such as collars or three-
way collars. 
With regards to underlying instruments, all the airlines have hedged using jet fuel 
contracts over the sample period. The only airline that has hedged with other underlying 
instrument in addition to jet fuel is Finnair. During the period 2006–2008, the airline 
had gasoil derivatives in addition to jet fuel contrac s. The company used jet fuel 
differential contracts as well to account for the product basis risk stemming from the 
cross hedging. However, only jet fuel has been employed in the jet fuel hedging since 
then. Because there is not sufficient availability on listed jet fuel derivatives, it can be 
assumed that all the airlines use over-the-counter contracts. What is more, the daily 
settlement of the positions would pose significant strains on the cash accounts should 
the hedges fall deep out of the money. 
The hedging policies and profiles are quite similar among the airlines except for 
Finnair. Likewise, all the airlines hedge on a rolling basis meaning that the hedging 
ratio is in accordance with the hedging policy at the beginning of each quarter. All the 
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airlines except Finnair have constant upper and lower hedging limits for the hedging 
tenor. Scandinavian Airlines 40–80%, Icelandair Group 40–60%, and Norwegian Air 
Shuttle 0–100%. On the contrary, Finnair has the most detailed hedging profile in place. 
The hedging policy sets the minimum and maximum hedging ratios up to three years in 
advance. The profile is layered hedging profile meaning that the upper and lower limits 
decline around 10% per quarter. Over the observation period, the hedging policies have 
evolved namely with regards to hedging limits. Only one company deviated from the 
hedging policy during the hedging period. However, Norwegian Air Shuttle’s hedging 
limits are quite trivial and require no hedging at all. In fact, the company had the least 
systematic jet fuel hedging over the period. With regards to hedging tenor dictated in 
the hedging policy, Finnair had on average the longest hedging tenor over the 
observation period (2.33 yrs). Scandinavian Airlines and Norwegian Air Shuttle both 
had an average hedging tenor of one year while Icelandair Group’s stated policy was on 
average 0.94 years in advance. 
Jet fuel hedging has seen some variation among the airlines over the period. Figure 
10 captures the hedging ratios of the anticipated jet fuel consumption for the next 12 
months at the end of each financial year. 
 
*Hedging ratio was not available for Icelandair Group in 2006 and 2010 as the financial 
statements did not include sufficient data for calculation. 
Figure 10 Hedging ratios for the coming year, % of the anticipated jet fuel consumption 
(source: Airline Annual Reports and Financial Statements) 
 In 2006, on average 49% of the next year’s anticipated fuel consumption was 
hedged. The figure dropped down to 36.7% in 2009 and remained around there up until 
the year 2013. Then the hedging on average was almost 46%. The hedging levels have 
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fact, these two airlines have been the most systematic and prudent in jet fuel hedging 
over the study period. On the contrary, at Icelandair Group there is more variation and 
inconsistency. In 2006 and 2010 the hedging ratio was not reported. Icelandair Group 
had no hedges in place in 2009 and the company has deviated from its hedging limits 
over the study period. However, hedging has been th least systematic at Norwegian Air 
Shuttle. In 2006, the airline had hedged 37.5% of the anticipated fuel consumption for 
the coming year. The next year, the company remained fully exposed and had no hedges 
in place. The hedging has been less than 10% of the anticipated consumption in five 
years during the period 2006–2014. The finding is quite surprising when considering the 
fact that the fuel expenses represented the highest s are of the total operating expenses 
for Norwegian Air Shuttle during the whole period. 
All the airlines employ operational hedging, but the use of alternative fuels is not 
systematic and has typically been employed in one-tim  occasions. The only airline not 
mentioning anything about alternative fuels is Icelandair Group. The airline also 
operated the oldest fleet. Furthermore, the Icelandair Group is the only airline that 
considered pricing an effective way to reduce the impact of fuel price increases, where 
as the other airlines didn’t find it feasible. With regards to current fleet, the airlines have 
refitted their old planes with lighter seats and materi ls so as to reduce the empty weight 
of the planes. Likewise, refitting the planes with new engines and installing winglets 
seems to be of common practice to reduce fuel consumption and thus price exposure. 
The airlines also operate aircrafts with fuel efficient operational practices such as the 
continuous descent approach and aim at flying direct route. In addition, all the carriers 
have acquired or have on order new, more fuel-effici nt planes made out of composite 
materials to a much larger extent than the traditional aluminium-bodied planes. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
All the listed airlines in the Nordic countries engage in jet fuel hedging by using 
derivatives instruments. The hedging is dictated either by the risk management policy or 
financial policy. In addition, most of the carriers employ a mixture of derivatives 
instruments which is line with Morrel (2007). Over the observation period a 
combination of swaps and options have been the mostcommon in jet fuel hedging. The 
usage of forwards is less common. In fact, since 2011 only Norwegian Air Shuttle has 
employed forward contracts in jet fuel hedging. 
Most of the airlines employed operational hedging practices that aim at reducing fuel 
consumption in the short term, except for Icelandair Group. The operational measures 
where similar to those discussed in Morrel (2003). What is more, only Icelandair Group 
claimed passing the fuel surcharge onto customers as way to hedge against fuel price 
increases in short term. This supports Morrel and Swan (2006) that cargo airlines are 
better positioned to pass on the fuel bills to customers.  
The actual hedging practices, however, are not quite homogenous. Especially, the 
hedging ratios have varied among the carriers between the years 2006 and 2014. Finnair 
and Scandinavian Airlines have had the highest hedging ratios over the observation 
period, and they have also been the most systematic in he jet fuel hedging over time. 
What is more, all the airlines employ over-the-counter contracts, and zero cost 
structures in options are most common. One reason for this is likely that listed products 
would pose significant strains on liquidity due to actual daily settlements, and the option 
premiums in simple call options would add up to signif cant amounts which supports 
Morrel and Swan (2006) in the discussion of required cash margins. Furthermore, the jet 
fuel is not broadly available as a listed product. However, the wide use of jet fuel as the 
underlying and not using futures contracts in hedging is not in line with previous 
research, especially Cobbs and Wolf (2004). One potntial reason could be that their 
study focused on U.S. airlines. 
The results for jet fuel exposure are mixed. Only Norwegian Air Shuttle and 
Icelandair Group exhibited negative and statistically significant jet fuel exposure terms. 
The exposure terms where -0.362 and -0.333 respectively, and both were statistically 
significant at the 0.01 confidence level. However, Scandinavian Airlines had an 
exposure term of -0.048 and Finnair a positive term of 0.016. Neither of the terms were 
not statistically significant.  
Norwegian Air Shuttle, which was the only low-cost carrier, had the lowest hedging 
ratios over the observation period, and the most variation in hedging ratios. 
Furthermore, the hedging policy was quite trivial as well, anything between 0 and 100% 
of the anticipated consumption. Consequently, the airline exhibited the largest fuel price 
exposure and fuel expenditures for the airline where the highest in relation to operating 
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costs over the observation period. When compared to other carries, the low-cost carrier 
was the least systematic in hedging and its jet fuel price exposure was the highest. 
Icelandair Group was not very systematic either in its jet fuel hedging, and the airline 
was the only to deviate from its hedging policy over the observation period. Similar to 
Norwegian Air shuttle, Icelandair Group had a negative and statistically significant jet 
fuel exposure term. On the contrary, Scandinavian Airlines had more systematic jet fuel 
hedging practices over the observation period, and it id not exhibit statistically 
significant jet fuel exposure, although the exposure term was negative but much closer 
to zero than with Norwegian Air Shuttle or Icelandair Group. In addition, Scandinavian 
Airlines had the second highest hedging ratios during the sample period. Similarly, 
Finnair did not exhibit statistically significant exposure term, and the term was actually 
positive, although very close to zero. What is more, Finnair had the highest hedging 
ratios over the observation period and was the most prudent in its jet fuel hedging. 
Furthermore, Finnair was the only airline with a layered hedging profile and had the 
longest hedging tenor which was on average more than twice longer than with the rest 
of the Nordic listed airlines. The airline also exhibited the least exposure in its jet fuel 
hedging over the period of 2006 to 2014. The results are similar to those of Loudon 
(2004) where there was ambiguity in the findings. 
It seems that the higher the hedging ratio and the longer the hedging tenor, the less 
jet fuel exposure the airline faces. What is more, p udency and consistency yields less or 
no exposure at all in the light of the results. In contrast, the least systematic hedgers 
with the lowest hedging ratios seem to exhibit greater nd statistically significant jet 
fuel exposure. The evidence supports Bartram’s (2005) conclusions that some 
companies are more successful in hedging, and, therefor , exhibit less commodity price 
exposure. The exposures, however, are not in line with Carter, Roger, Simkins, and 
Treanor (2014) where they found the exposure to be negative and statistically 
significant for the listed U.S. airlines. The result , however, support Berghöfers and 
Luceys (2014) findings that the U.S. carriers are more exposed to jet fuel price changes 
than their European peers. The thesis only studied th  relatively small Nordic carriers 
and the model did not by no means exhaustively explain the logarithmic return of the 
airline stocks in the Nordic countries. 
Operational hedging is considered an important partin the effort to reduce jet fuel 
consumption, and, thus, jet fuel exposure. The airlines had invested in new fleet and 
also put effort into reducing the empty weight of the existing fleet. Most commonly, the 
airlines had replaced the seats with lighter seats and fitted the planes with winglets. 
Also, marginal improvements are considered significant because the planes fly hundreds 
of flights a year. However, alternative fuels are not systematically used in flying 
operations, only in few one-time occasions. This could be interpreted that the flying few 
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one-time flights using biofuels is more about green wash and public relations activities 





This thesis has focused on studying the jet fuel price exposure and hedging practices in 
the listed airlines in the Nordic countries. The airlines in the thesis included Finnair, 
Icelandair Group, Norwegian Air Shuttle, and Scandinav an Airlines. According to the 
best of the writer’s knowledge, the thesis is the first to study the jet fuel price exposure 
and jet fuel hedging practices in a mixed-methods framework. What is more, the study 
is the first one to qualitatively analyse the jet fuel hedging practices in a multi-year 
context, so as to provide evidence of the jet fuel hedging practices over a longer time 
period of 2006 to 2014. Since the sample airlines where small and from a narrow 
geographical market, the thesis could provide deeper understanding of the jet fuel 
hedging and exposure instead of simple time series analysis. 
The jet fuel costs are the most significant operating expense item for the airlines in 
the Nordic countries much like in the rest of the world. Managing this exposure is of 
common practice in the Nordic countries. The airlines can hedge jet fuel by using 
derivatives instruments, such as forwards, swaps, otions, and futures. In addition, 
operational hedging can also be considered a way to mitigate jet fuel exposure. In the 
thesis, a multivariate model was established to test for the exposure. The exposure was 
measured as the airline’s stock price sensitivity to jet fuel price changes returns. 
Respective stock market returns where used as the control variable. All the returns 
where transformed to logarithmic returns and the frequency was weekly returns. 
In the Nordic countries all the listed airlines hedg  against the jet fuel price exposure 
by using derivatives instruments. Nordic listed airlines hedged mostly by using a 
combination of options and swaps. Forwards where less common and futures non-
existent. The airlines typically hedged using jet fuel as the underlying. Likewise, the 
derivatives where over-the-counter. This was mostly due to listed product’s daily 
settlement and the poor availability of listed jet fuel products. 
The airlines with the least systematic jet fuel hedging exhibited negative and 
statistically significant jet fuel exposures, where as the most systematic hedgers with the 
highest hedging ratios did not exhibit statistically significant jet fuel exposure. 
Systematic hedging and higher hedging ratios could explain why Finnair and 
Scandinavian Airlines did not exhibit statistically significant jet fuel exposures. What is 
more, operational measures where also common among the airlines in mitigating the jet 
fuel price risk. These included continuous descent approaches, flying direct route, 
refitting planes with lighter seats and materials, nd installing winglets on the planes 
among others. Investment in modern fuel efficient fleet was also common at the airlines. 
Although, the multivariate regression analysis did not exhaustively explain the airline 
stock returns, it provided evidence with regards the jet fuel price exposure of the 
relatively small listed carriers in the Nordic countries. What is more, the qualitative 
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analysis of the hedging practices combined with the time series analysis provided 
reasoning for the existence or absence of the jet fu l exposure. For further research, 
researchers should study the relationship of jet ful exposure with both the consistency 
of the jet fuel hedging practices and the level of the hedging ratios with larger sample, 
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APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW 
• Could you tell about your position and job description at Finnair? 
• Do you engage in dialogue with specific personnel or departments with regards 
to hedging decision? 
• How would you describe the development of the airline industry over the past 
decade? Has there been any concrete developments or changes related to it? 
• How has the price of oil affected your operations over the past decade? Has the 
oil price volatility had any immediate effects on your operational activities and 
has it somehow been reflected on the risk management of jet fuel price risk? 
• What kind of framework and strategy does Finnair have in fuel price risk 
management? Could you describe it and the limits it sets to jet fuel hedging? 
• What do strive to achieving by managing jet fuel price risk? Do you consider 
jet fuel price risk management as an important functio  in airline business? 
• What derivatives instruments do you employ in jet fuel hedging and what are 
the underlying assets? 
• On what basis do you choose the underlying instrument and how do you take 
into consideration the potential basis risk in cross-hedging? Do you somehow 
manage the basis risk? 
• Do you employ option structures in jet fuel hedging? If so, why are these very 
structures preferred in hedging and what do you seek for with them instead of 
simple call options? 
• Are the derivatives instruments employed in hedging listed, over-the-counter or 
both? 
• What kind of counterparties does Finnair have in hedging? How do you take 
into consideration the counterparty risk in OTC contracts? 
• Does the relative small size of Finnair have any implications on hedging 
activities and the derivatives used in jet fuel hedging? Do you perceive that the 
small size of the airline introduces any challenges and, if so, could you 
describe them? 
• Do you analyse the price formation of fuel and oil into the future and do you let 
analyst forecasts to have any implications on hedging? 
• What operational measures does Finnair employ in mitigating jet fuel 
exposure? To what extent are these operational measures actively developed? 
• How do you perceive the alternative and unconventional fuels in replacing 
crude oil as the main source for jet fuel? Do you aim t utilising biofuels and 
would you consider them as a relevant alternative in the future? 
 
